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dsordels, thisArticle proposes important amendments to federal and state health insurance laws
and andiscrnnadon laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a thirty-five-year-old attorney named Gary. During the
day, Gary practices intellectual property law at a prominent New
Orleans law firm. At night, Gary plays poker at Harrah's New Orleans
Hotel and Casino, located just blocks away from the French Quarter
and the New Orleans Riverfront.
Following a string of poker losses, Gary vows to stop gambling.
Unfortunately, each attempt by Gary to stop gambling is unsuccessful.
Regardless of how hard he tries to focus on his family and his law
practice, Gary has persistent thoughts relating to his past poker wins
and his future poker tournaments. Gary also has become preoccupied
with finding creative ways to finance his gambling habit and has
begun to lie to his wife, his law partners, and his clients regarding the
extent of his gambling problem and the sources of funds he uses to
finance his gambling. Recently, Gary's gambling debts have grown so
high that he borrowed money from his law firm clients' trust accounts,
in violation of Rule 1.15 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct.'
After learning of the trust account improprieties, the managing
partner of Gary's law firm asks Gary to take a leave of absence from
the partnership to obtain treatment for his problem gambling. Gary
schedules an appointment with a mental health professional who
subsequently diagnoses Gary with "gambling disorder" under the fifth
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in
May 2013.' The mental health professional recommends that Gary
participate in a twenty-two-day residential treatment program for
individuals with gambling disorder that is located near New Orleans,
on the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain. Unfortunately, Gary's health
insurance excludes both inpatient and outpatient treatments for
gambling disorder from coverage. Because he has spent his savings
1. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.15(a) (2011) (requiring attorneys who
practice law in Louisiana to separate and properly safeguard client trust fund accounts).
2. See Am. PSYcHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 585 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
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chasing gambling losses and has a heavily mortgaged house located in
the affluent Garden District neighborhood, Gary cannot afford to pay
for the residential treatment program. Gary's gambling continues, and
he now gambles more than ever before.
Shortly after learning that Gary has not followed through with
treatment, Gary's managing partner terminates Gary's partnership with
the law firm. Gary becomes anxious, wondering how he will support
his family and pay for the treatment he finally admits he needs. With
the hope of partially offsetting his lost law firm salary, Gary applies for
disability income insurance benefits from the federal Social Security
Administration and from his private disability income insurer.
Unfortunately, both of Gary's applications are declined after the
insurers find that Gary's loss of income results from his misappro-
priation of client trust fund accounts, not from an accident or injury.
With dwindling savings and difficulty finding employment at a new
law firm, Gary asks an attorney who specializes in employment
discrimination whether he might have a case against his old law firm
for disability discrimination. The attorney explains to Gary that
federal and state antidiscrimination laws currently exclude gambling
disorder from the definition of disability.
Gary begins to wonder: if he had cancer, quadriplegia, bipolar
disorder, or Alzheimer's disease, he would receive full protection under
his health insurance policy, his disability income insurance policy, and
federal and state antidiscrimination laws. The fact that Gary's disease
relates to gambling, however, makes him ineligible for coverage and
protection under the most basic of health and disability laws. This
Article questions the legal treatment of individuals with gambling
disorder under health insurance, disability income insurance, and
antidiscrimination law.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the history of
the APA's understanding and diagnostic classification of gambling
disorder. First identified as "pathological gambling" in 1980 in the
third edition of the Diagnosdc and Stadsdcal Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-III), the condition was grouped with kleptomania,
pyromania, intermittent explosive disorder, and isolated explosive
disorder in a section of the DSM-UL relating to "Disorders of Impulse
Control Not Elsewhere Classified." As an impulse control disorder,
pathological gambling was characterized with reference to an
3. AM. PsYcHIATRIc ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 291 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-M].
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individual's "chronic and progressive failure to resist impulses to
gamble [as well as] gambling behavior that compromises, disrupts, or
damages personal, family, or vocational pursuits." With few changes,
pathological gambling remained in the "Disorders of Impulse Control
Not Elsewhere Classified" section of the revised third edition of the
Diagnosdc and Statidcal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II-R)
(1987),' the fourth edition of the Diagnostc and Stalstical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (1994),' and the text revision of the
fourth edition of the Diagnostc and Statisdcal Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (2000).' In May 2013, the APA released the
DSM-5, which renamed the condition "gambling disorder" and
reclassified it under "Non-Substance-Related Disorders" within the
"Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders" chapter.! The APA
explained that the condition's new name and classification reflected
clinical research findings suggesting "that gambling disorder is similar
to [alcohol use disorder and other] substance-related disorders in
clinical expression, brain origin, comorbidity, physiology, and
treatment."9
Part III of this Article examines the current scientific literature
investigating gambling disorder. These studies reveal important
information about the prevalence of gambling disorder, its
comorbidities, its environmental and genetic factors, its neurobio-
logical correlates, and its functional consequences. Functional
neuroimaging studies, in particular, have begun to delineate the neural
circuitry and neurochemistry involved in gambling disorder. These
neuroimaging studies suggest multiple similarities between gambling
disorder and other substance-related and addictive disorders. Part III
reviews the current scientific understanding of gambling disorder and
lays the foundation for the arguments and proposals set forth in Part
VII of this Article.
Part IV of this Article examines the current status of gambling
disorder under mental health insurance parity and essential health
4. Id.
5. AM. PsYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 324 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-II-R].
6. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 615 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
7. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STAISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 671 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
8. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 585; see also Substance-Related and Addictive
Disorders, AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N 1 (2013), http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Substance%
20Use%20Disorder%o20Fact%/20Sheet.pdf.
9. See Substance-Related andAddictive Disonfers, supra note 8, at 1.
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benefits laws. Designed to reduce discrimination against individuals
with mental health conditions in the context of health insurance,
federal and state mental health parity laws require most, but not all,
health plans to treat offered gambling disorder insurance benefits at
parity with offered physical health insurance benefits. Designed to
ensure that insureds are offered mental health insurance benefits,
federal and state essential health benefits laws require many, but not
all, health plans to include certain mental health benefits in their health
insurance policies. Part IV of this Article identifies the protections and
limitations of current federal and state mental health parity and
essential health benefits laws, including the essential health benefits
requirements that became effective on January 1, 2014, with respect to
individuals who have gambling disorder. Part IV also examines the
impact of the May 2013 publication of the DSM-5 on health insurance
coverage of gambling disorder. Part IV shows how, even after the full
implementation of the Affordable Care Act and the publication of the
DSM-5, some insureds with gambling disorder still do not have equal
access to gambling disorder insurance benefits.
Part V of this Article examines the status of gambling disorder
under public and private disability income insurance benefits programs
and plans. Although not specifically excluded from federal Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, individuals with
gambling disorder face an uphill battle during the application process.
That is, individuals with gambling disorder who apply for SSDI
benefits must prove that their disorders are so severe that they can
neither do their previous work nor any other kind of substantial gainful
work that exists in the national economy. Although not usually
excluded from private disability income insurance benefits, individuals
with gambling disorder and other comorbid disorders may succeed in
their applications for private disability benefits if they can prove that
their disabilities caused their losses of income. On the other hand,
individuals with gambling disorder may be denied disability insurance
benefits if their losses of income are determined to result from a
criminal or other illegal act instead of an "accident or injury" within
the terms of their insurance policies. Unlike current health insurance
exclusions of gambling disorder treatments, Part V of this Article
approves of the individualized disability assessments that take place in
the context of public and private disability income insurance and
suggests this case-by-case approach as a model for use in the health
insurance and antidiscrimination law contexts.
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Part VI of this Article examines the status of gambling disorder
under current federal and state antidiscrimination laws that prohibit
discrimination based on disability. Although the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 did not specifically exclude individuals with gambling disorder
from legal protection, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)
as well as many state antidiscrimination laws that are modeled after the
ADA expressly exclude individuals with gambling disorder from
protection.o Part VI uses Rezza v US. Department of Justice, a case
involving a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent with gambling
disorder that was litigated by this author's University of Nevada, Las
Vegas (UNLV) colleague Professor Jean Sternlight," to illustrate how
current antidiscrimination laws can hurt problem gamblers.
Part VII of this Article offers seven arguments against the
disparate legal treatment of gambling disorder in the contexts of health
insurance coverage and antidiscrimination law. Part VII concludes by
proposing corrections to essential health benefits laws, state mental
health parity laws, state benchmark health plans, and federal and state
antidiscrimination laws that will place individuals with gambling
disorder on equal footing with individuals with other substance-related
and addictive conditions.
II. GAMBLING DISORDER: HISTORY AND DIAGNOSTIC
CLASSIFICATION
Gambling disorder is a relatively new-or newly understood-
disorder. Formally recognized by the APA in the DSM-III in 1980,12
the condition then-named "pathological gambling" was classified
within the "Disorders of Impulse Control Not Elsewhere Classified.""
10. See42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012).
11. Rezza v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 87-6732, 1988 WL 48541, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa.
May 16, 1988), reconsideradon denie4 698 F Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (listing Jean
Sternlight. as plaintiffs counsel); Jean Stemigh4 UNIv. NEv LAS VEGAS WILLIAM S. BOYD
SCH. LAw (2014), http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/jean-steralight.html.
12. The word "gambling" does not appear anywhere in the first or second editions of
the DSM. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL
DISORDERS (1st ed. 1952) [hereinafter DSM-I]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS WITH SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT ON PLANS FOR
REVISION (1965) [hereinafter DSM-I-R]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter DSM-II]; see also
Randy Stinchfield, Reliability Validity and Classification Accuacy of a Measure of DSM-
IV Diagnostic Criteria for Pathological Gambling, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 180, 180 (2003)
("Pathological gambling was formally recognized as a mental disorder by APA in DSM-m.").
13. DSM-Ill, supra note 3, at 291-93.
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Characterized with reference to an individual's "chronic and
progressive failure to resist impulses to gamble and gambling behavior
that compromises, disrupts, or damages personal, family, or vocational
pursuits," pathological gambling was believed by the APA to have an
adolescent age of onset and to be more common among males than
females and more common in the fathers of males and in the mothers
of females.14 Predisposing factors were thought to include "loss of
parent by death, separation, divorce, or desertion before [the individual
turns] 15 years of age; inappropriate parental discipline . . .; exposure
to gambling activities as an adolescent; a high family value on material
and financial symbols; and lack of family emphasis on saving,
planning, and budgeting.""
The DSM-llI established three main diagnostic criteria for
pathological gambling: (1) "[t]he individual [must be] chronically and
progressively unable to resist impulses to gamble"; (2) the individual's
"[g]ambling [must] compromise[], disrupt[], or damage[] family,
personal, and vocational pursuits, as indicated by at least three of
[seven subcriteria]"; and (3) the individual's gambling must not be due
to antisocial personality disorder." The seven subcriteria within the
second criterion included:
(1) arrest for forgery, fraud, embezzlement, or income tax evasion due
to attempts to obtain money for gambling
(2) default on debts or other financial responsibilities
(3) disrupted family or spouse relationship due to gambling
(4) borrowing of money from illegal sources (loan sharks)
(5) inability to account for loss of money or to produce evidence of
winning money, if this is claimed
(6) loss of work due to absenteeism in order to pursue gambling
activity
(7) necessity for another person to provide money to relieve a
desperate financial situation."
The DSM-Ll distinguished pathological gambling from social
gambling, defined as gambling with friends "on special occasions and
with predetermined acceptable losses.""
Pathological gambling reportedly made its way into the DSM-IH
due to the efforts of Dr. Robert Custer, a psychiatrist who had treated
14. Id at 291-92.
15. Id. at 292.
16. Id. at 292-93.
17. Id. at 293.
18. Id. at 292.
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pathological gamblers and had written about their conditions. 9 The
DSM-111 diagnostic criteria were not tested beforehand; instead, the
criteria were based on the clinical experience of Dr. Custer and other
mental health professionals.20
Seven years later, in the DSM-llI-R (1987), the APA tinkered
with the diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling. That is, the
APA recharacterized pathological gambling as:
Maladaptive gambling behavior, as indicated by at least four of [nine
criteria]:
(1) frequent preoccupation with gambling or with obtaining money to
gamble
(2) frequent gambling of larger amounts of money or over a longer
period of time than intended
(3) a need to increase the size or frequency of bets to achieve the
desired excitement
(4) restlessness or irritability if unable to gamble
(5) repeated loss of money by gambling and returning another day to
win back losses ("chasing")
(6) repeated efforts to reduce or stop gambling
(7) frequent gambling when expected to meet social or occupational
obligations
(8) sacrifice of some important social, occupational, or recreational
activity in order to gamble
(9) continuation of gambling despite inability to pay mounting debts,
or despite other significant social, occupational, or legal problems
that the person knows to be exacerbated by gambling[j21
Seven years later, in the DSM-IV (1994), the APA continued to
tinker with the diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling.22 Under
the DSM-IV pathological gambling was characterized with reference
to "persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior ... that
disrupts personal, -family, or vocational pursuits." Although the
DSM-UI and the DSM-ll-R distinguished pathological gambling from
social gambling,24 they did not distinguish pathological gambling from
professional gambling. According to the DSM-IV pathological
19. See Christine Reilly & Nathan Smith, The Evolving Definiton of Pathological
Gambling in the DSM-5, NAT'L CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE GAMING 2 (2013), http://www.
ncrg.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/white-papers/ncrwpdsm5_jnay20 l3.pdf.
20. Id
21. DSM-nI-R, supra note 5, at 325.
22. DSM-IV supm note 6, at 618.
23. Id. at 615.
24. See DSM-Ll, supm note 3, at 292; DSM-nI-R, supr note 5, at 324.
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gambling is different from professional gambling, which involves
limited risks and significant discipline."
Building on the DSM-UI-R, which required at least four of nine
criteria to be present for a diagnosis of pathological gambling, the
DSM-IV required the presence of at least five of ten criteria; that is,
the individual:
(1) is preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with reliving past
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture,
or thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble)
(2) needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to
achieve the desired excitement
(3) has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop
gambling
(4) is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop
gambling
(5) gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a
dysphoric mood (e.g., feelings of helplessness, guilt, anxiety,
depression)
(6) after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get
even ("chasing" one's losses)
(7) lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent
of involvement with gambling
(8) has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or
embezzlement to finance gambling
(9) has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or
educational or career opportunity because of gambling
(10) relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial
situation caused by gambling[.]26
(The DSM-IV-TR, published in 2000, also required the presence of at
least five of the same ten criteria listed in the DSMIV 27)
Following the publication of the DSM-IV some critics voiced
concern regarding the manual's clinical description of pathological
gambling. 28 For example, some critics noted the lack of empirical
(versus observational) support for the diagnostic criteria for
pathological gambling." Some critics noted that the empirical
25. DSM-IV supra note 6, at 617.
26. DSM-II-R, supra note 5, at 325; DSM-IV, supm note 6, at 618.
27. DSM-IV-TR, supo note 7, at 674.
28. Reilly & Smith, supra note 19, at 3.
29. Id. But see Stinchfield, supa note 12, at 180 ("The DSM-IV diagnostic criteria
for pathological gambling, when operationalized into questions, demonstrated satisfactory
reliability, validity, and classification accuracy, and a cutoff score of 4 improved diagnostic
precision."); David R. Strong & Christopher W Kahler, Evaluation of the Contnuum of
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literature that did exist suggested that problem gambling existed on a
continuum and that subclinical" instances of pathological gambling
were relatively frequent." According to these critics, the DSM-IV
overlooked this continuum and resulted in a nondiagnosis when an
individual met fewer than five criteria.32 In addition, some critics
questioned the inclusion of pathological gambling within "Impulse-
Control Disorders Not Elsewhere Classified."" Since the publication
of the DSM-IV scientists have observed that individuals with other
impulse control disorders, such as kleptomania and pyromania, "fe[lt]
overwhelmed by an impulse to act and often report a sense of relief
after having acted."34  In contrast, scientists found that pathological
gamblers enjoyed their gambling and only felt distress after their
gambling was terminated or they incurred losses."
The DSM-5, published in 2013," takes pathological gambling in
a new direction. First, the DSM-5 renames the condition "gambling
disorder,"" reflecting concerns that the adjective "pathological" is
pejorative and reinforces the social stigma associated with problem
Gambling Problems Using the DSM-IY 102 ADDIcTION 713, 713 (2007) ("The DSM-IV-
based symptom index appeared to have sufficient reliability to separate life-time pathological
gamblers from other gamblers using the current diagnostic threshold of five or more
symptoms. However, the DSM-IV symptom index did not have sufficient reliability to
separate further among groups of gamblers who reported fewer than five symptoms.").
30. Gambling and Health in the Workplace: A Research-Based Guide About
Gambling Disorders for Human Resources and Employee Assistance Professionals, NAT'L
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE GAMING 5 (2012), http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/files/uploads/
docs/publiceducation outreach/ncrgguide hr.final.pdf ("The most recent national survey
estimates that 0.6 percent of the general adult population in the United States has or has had a
pathological gambling disorder in their lifetime. An additional 2.3 percent have had some
problems with gambling in their lifetime but have not met diagnostic criteria for pathological
gambling. This group is considered 'subclinical' or 'problem gamblers."' (footnote omitted)).
31. Reilly & Smith, supm note 19, at 3.
32. Seeid
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Howard J. Shaffer et al., Esthiating the Prevalence of Disordered
Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-Analysis, HARV. MED. SCH.
DivisION ON ADDICTIONs 2 (Dec. 15, 1997), http://www.divisiononaddiction.org/html/
publications/meta.pdf.)
35. Id.
36. See Nancy M. Petry et al., An Overview ofand Rationale for Changes Proposed
for Pathological Gamblingih the DSM-5, 30 J. GAMBLING STUD. 493, 494 (2014) (noting that
the APA's Substance Use and Related Disorders Workgroup was convened in 2007, made
initial recommendations in 2009, issued draft changes that were made publicly available in
2012, received additional public input, and drafted the DSM-5 text in 2012, which was then
approved by the Board of Trustees in the fall of 2012).
37. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 585.
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gambling." Second, the DSM-5 reclassifies gambling disorder and
places it as the sole disorder within the "Non-Substance-Related
Disorders" section within the larger "Substance-Related and Addictive
Disorders" chapter." Now, gambling disorder follows alcohol use
disorder, cannabis use disorder, opioid use disorder, stimulant use
disorder, and tobacco use disorder, among other substance-related and
addictive disorders.40 According to the APA, the change in gambling
disorder's classification reflects the fact that "little evidence exists on
the associations between [trichotillomania, intermittent explosive
disorder, kleptomania, and pyromania] and gambling disorder."4' The
change also reflects neuroimaging evidence that gambling behaviors
activate neural reward systems similar to those activated by drugs of
abuse and produce behavioral systems that appear comparable to those
produced by the substance use disorders.42 Charles O'Brien, M.D.,
who chaired the Substance-Related Disorders Work Group for the
DSM-5, explains:
The idea of a non-substance-related addiction may be new to some
people, but those of us who are studying the mechanisms of addiction
find strong evidence from animal and human research that addiction is
a disorder of the brain reward system, and it doesn't matter whether the
system is repeatedly activated by gambling or alcohol or another
substance .... In functional brain imaging-whether with gamblers or
drug addicts-when they are showed video or photograph cues
associated with their addiction, the same brain areas are activated.43
Third, although the DSM-IV required five of ten criteria to be
present for a diagnosis, the DSM-5 eliminated the former eighth
criterion relating to the commission of illegal acts such as forgery,
fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance gambling." The elimination
38. Petry et al., supra note 36, at 494 ("Over the past three decades, the term
'pathological' has become outdated and pejorative. Thus, the name of the disorder will be
altered in DSM-5 to 'gambling disorder."'); Reilly & Smith, supm note 19, at 4.
39. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 481, 585.
40. Id at 483-585; Constance Holden, Behavioral Addictions Debut n Proposed
DSM-y 327 Sa. 935, 935 (2010) (noting that gambling disorder would be the only disorder
in the behavioral, or nonsubstance, portion of the substance-related and addictive disorders
category).
41. Petry et al., supm note 36, at 495.
42. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 481; see also Kenneth Blum et al., Reward Deficiency
Syndrome, 84 AM. ScIENTIsT 132, 140 (1996) (noting the affinities between pathological
gambling and alcohol and drug abuse).
43. Mark Moran, Gambling Disorder To Be Included in Addictions Chapter,
PSYCHIATRYONLINE.ORG (Apr. 19, 2013), http://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/newsArticle.aspx?
articleid=1680428.
44. Compare DSM-IV-TR, supm note 7, at 674, with DSM-5, supr note 2, at 585.
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of this criterion reflects a lack of empirical evidence showing that
assessing criminal behavior helps diagnose individuals with gambling
disorder.45 The APA's explanatory text in the DSM-5 continues to state,
however, that instances of deceit associated with gambling disorder
may include "covering up illegal behaviors such as forgery, fraud, theft,
or embezzlement to obtain money with which to gamble."'
Fourth, the DSM-5 changes the prefatory description of the
condition as well as the time period in which the symptoms and
behaviors described in the diagnostic criteria must occur. The DSM-
IV-TR simply described the disorder as "[p]ersistent and recurrent
maladaptive gambling behavior as indicated by five (or more) of the
[ten criteria]."' The DSM-5 is more specific and requires "[p]ersistent
and recurrent problematic gambling behavior leading to clinically
significant impairment or distress, as indicated by the individual
exhibiting four (or more) of [nine criteria] in a 12-month period.'"'
Thus, an individual who had three symptoms last year and two
different symptoms this year would meet the criteria for pathological
gambling under the DSM-IV-TR but may not meet the criteria for
gambling disorder under the DSM-5, depending on when those
symptoms manifested.49
Fifth, the DSM-5 reorders and changes the language of some of
the remaining diagnostic criteria. For example, in the DSM-IV-TR, the
first criterion required the individual to be "preoccupied with
gambling.""o In the DSM-5, this criterion has been moved to the fourth
criterion and now requires the individual only to be "often preoccupied
with gambling"" (similar to the DSM-III-R, which required "frequent
preoccupation with gambling").52 As a result, an individual does not
have to be preoccupied with gambling all the time in order to meet the
45. Reilly & Smith, supm note 19, at 4; see Strong & Kahler, supm note 29, at 717
(examining the gambling data from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and
Related Conditions (NESARC), finding that the former criterion relating to illegal acts was
most helpful only for identifying individuals with the highest levels of gambling problem
severity and that individuals who commit illegal acts as a result of their disordered gambling
already reach the threshold of five or more symptoms, and concluding that the criterion does
not improve the precision with which individuals are diagnosed with pathological gambling).
46. DSM-5, supm note 2, at 586.
47. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at 674.
48. DSM-5, supm note 2, at 585.
49. See Reilly & Smith, supm note 19, at 4 (explaining the difference in the time
frame requirements between the DSM-IV and the DSM-5).
50. DSM-IV-TR, supm note 7, at 674.
51. DSM-5, supr note 2, at 585.
52. DSM-m-R, supm note 5, at 325.
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criterion." The individual only needs to be "often" preoccupied with
gambling.
By further example, the fifth criterion in the DSM-IV-TR
required the individual to "gamble[] as a way of escaping from
problems or of relieving a dysphoric mood (e.g., feelings of
helplessness, guilt, anxiety, depression)."54 The DSM-5 simplifies this
criterion to require the individual to "[o]ften gamble[] when feeling
distressed (e.g., helpless, guilty, anxious, depressed)."55
By final example, the seventh criterion of the DSM-IV-TR
provided that the individual "lies to family members, therapist, or
others to conceal the extent of involvement with gambling." The
DSM-5 simplifies this criterion, which now reads, "[flies to conceal
the extent of involvement with gambling."'
Let us now return to Gary, the thirty-five-year-old New Orleans
attorney who plays poker at Harrah's New Orleans Hotel and Casino.
Although he has vowed to stop gambling multiple times, Gary's efforts
thus far have been unsuccessful. As a result, Gary would meet the
third diagnostic criterion in the DSM-5 relating to "repeated
unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling."58
Remember that Gary also has persistent thoughts relating to his past
poker wins and his future poker tournaments, which would satisfy the
fourth criterion ("often preoccupied with gambling (e.g., having
persistent thoughts of reliving past gambling experiences,
handicapping or planning the next venture[)]")." Remember, too, that
Gary has lied to his wife, his law partners, and his clients regarding the
sources of funds he uses to finance his gambling, which would satisfy
the seventh diagnostic criterion ("[f]ies to conceal the extent of
involvement with gambling")." Notwithstanding his efforts to stop,
Gary's gambling continues, and he now needs to gamble with more
money than ever before in satisfaction of the first criterion ("[n]eeds to
gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the
desired excitement")." Finally, remember that Gary's gambling debts
53. Reilly & Smith, supra note 19, at 4.
54. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at 674.
55. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 585; see Reilly & Smith, supm note 19, at 4 (noting the
change from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5).
56. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at 674.
57. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 585.
58. See id
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Id
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have grown so quickly that he borrowed money from his law firm
clients' trust accounts in violation of Rule 1.15 of the Louisiana Rules
of Professional Conduct,62 which resulted in Gary's forced leave of
absence and, ultimately, the loss of his partnership. This turn of events
satisfies the eighth diagnostic criterion ("[h]as jeopardized or lost a
significant relationship, job, or educational or career opportunity
because of gambling")." Because he meets four or more of the nine
diagnostic criteria, Gary's mental health professional has accurately
diagnosed Gary with gambling disorder under the DSM-5.
Clinicians have known for several decades that gambling disorder
can be "extremely incapacitating and result[] in [the] failure to
maintain financial solvency" as well as the inability to "provide basic
support for oneself or one's family."' Clinicians also have known for
quite some time that individuals like Gary who have gambling disorder
tend to become alienated from family members and acquaintances and
tend to lose what they have accomplished or attained in life, such as a
previously happy marriage or a law firm partnership." Clinicians also
have recognized for several decades the many complications of
gambling disorder, including suicide attempts, association with fringe
and illegal groups, and arrest for nonviolent crimes that may lead to
imprisonment." Until somewhat recently, however, other basic
statistical and scientific information relating to gambling disorder,
including its causes, correlates, and treatments, has not been available.
62. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.15(a) (2011) (requiring attorneys who
practice law in Louisiana to separate and properly safeguard client trust fund accounts).
Some attorneys with gambling disorder may attempt to borrow money from their clients' trust
fund accounts to pay off their personal gambling debts in violation of state rules of
professional conduct. See, e.g., Reilly v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 1-06-CV-14-CRWRAW,
2007 WL 1485103, at *1, *3 (S.D. Iowa May 16, 2007) (reporting the case of an Iowa
attorney whose license to practice law was revoked by the Iowa Supreme Court when he
misappropriated over $90,000 of a client's funds to pay personal debts associated with his
gambling disorder). See generally Gambling and Health in the Justice System: A Research-
Based Guide About Gamblmg Disorders for Judges, Parole Officers, Attorneys and Other
Professionals Involved in the Justice System, NAT'L CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE GAMING
(2013), http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/publiceducation-outreach/ncrg
guide-judicial2013web.pdf [hereinafter Justice System Guide] (suggesting ways in which
therapeutic and mental health courts may help individuals with gambling disorders who
engage in criminal behavior).
63. DSM-5, supm note 2, at 585.
64. See, e g., DSM-III, supra note 3, at 292.
65. Id.
66. Id
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III. GAMBLING DISORDER: SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING
Over time, problem gambling has been viewed through multiple
lenses, including moral, mathematical, economic, social,
psychological, cultural, genetic, and, more recently, neurobiological
lenses." The final decade of the twentieth century and the first decade
and a half of the twenty-first century have witnessed a tremendous
growth in health and social science research relating to gambling
disorder." This research has yielded reliable information regarding the
prevalence of gambling disorder, its environmental and genetic
influences, and its neural correlates, as well as the disorder's public
health implications, diagnostic standards, and treatment modalities."
This information is helpful for evaluating current health and disability
laws and in proposing new health and disability laws and policies. Part
III lays the scientific foundation for the legal and policy arguments
made in Part VII.
One line of important research relates to gambling disorder
comorbidities. In the context of gambling disorder, comorbidity
research examines the existence of additional, concurrent disorders in
an individual who has gambling disorder. It also analyzes the way in
which gambling disorder and these other disorders may interact and
the way in which treatment (or lack of treatment) for one disorder may
help or interfere with treatment for another disorder." As one might
67. See Howard J. Shaffer & David A. Korn, Gambling and Related Mental
Disordels: A Public Health Analysis, 23 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 171 (2002); see also Anna
E. Goudriaan et al., Pathological Gambling: A Comprehensive Review of Biobehavioral
Findings, 28 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 123 (2004) (discussing findings of
biobehavioral research into pathological gambling with a focus on neuropsychological,
psychophysiological, neuroimaging, neurochemical, and genetic studies).
68. Shaffer & Kom, supra note 67, at 171; Research & Resources: A Guide to
Gamblig Disorders and Responsible Gamig, NAT'L CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE GAMING 5
(2011), http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/files/oec/pdfs/researchandresources201 1.pdf [here-
inafter Research & Resources]. "In the early 1990s, a lack of financial support [stunted] the
growth of ... research into gambling disorders. The result was few peer-reviewed
publications, [potentially flawed research,] and a gap in understanding gambling disorders"
compared to other mental health conditions, such as alcohol use disorder and drug use
disorder. The National Center for Responsible Gaming (NCRG) was established in 1996 to
serve as a national funding source in the areas of gambling research and responsible gaming
outreach and education. Research & Resources, supra, at 5.
69. Research & Resources, supra note 68, at 6.
70. See, e.g., Felicity K. Lorains, Sean Cowlishaw & Shane A. Thomas, Prevalence
of Comorbid Disordets i Problem and Pathological Gambling: Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis ofPopulation Surveys, 106 ADDICTION 490, 490 (2011) ("This paper reviews
evidence pertaining to the prevalence of common comorbid disorders, including alcohol use
disorder, depression, substance use disorders, nicotine dependence, anxiety disorders and
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imagine, the existence of gambling comorbid disorders makes it
difficult to determine whether the act of gambling causes a gambling
disorder or whether another disorder may have caused the disordered
gambling.71 Or, perhaps it is the existence of both gambling disorder
and the other disorder that suggests an underlying addiction
syndrome.72 Understanding the relationships between and among
comorbid disorders can improve our understanding of the correlates
and causes of gambling disorder and improve treatments for gambling
disorder."
To this end, a number of important research studies have
investigated the relationship between gambling disorder and other
health conditions. For example, a study published in 2008 by scientists
affiliated with Harvard Medical School, the Cambridge Health
Alliance, and the University of Minnesota analyzed the gambling data
included in the United States National Comorbidity Survey
Replication (NCS-R), "a face-to-face household survey of 9,282
English-speaking respondents ages 18 years and older carried out
between February 2001 and April 2003 in a nationally representative
multi-stage clustered area probability sample of the US household
population."74 The purpose of the study was to increase knowledge of
the prevalence and correlates of pathological gambling (the term then
in effect under the DSM-IV-TR)."
In the total sample examined, the lifetime prevalence (with
standard error in parentheses) estimate of problem gambling was 2.3%
(0.3) and the lifetime prevalence estimate of pathological gambling
was 0.6% (0. 1)." The study authors also found that lifetime
pathological gambling was significantly associated in the total sample
with other disorders; that is, 96.3% of respondents with lifetime
pathological gambling also met lifetime criteria for one or more other
Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI)/DSM-IV
antisocial personality disorder, in population-representative samples of problem and
pathological gamblers.").
71. Research & Resources, suprd note 68, at 10.
72. Id.
73. Lorains, Cowlishaw & Thomas, supra note 70, at 490 ("Problem and pathological
gamblers experience high levels of other comorbid mental health disorders and screening for
comorbid disorders upon entering treatment for gambling problems is recommended.");
Research & Resources, supra note 68, at 10.
74. R.C. Kessler et al., DSM-IVPathological Gambling in the National Comorbidity
SurveyReplication, 38 PSYCHOL. MED. 1351, 1351-52 (2008).
75. Seeid.at1351.
76. Id. at 1353.
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disorders and 64.4% suffered from three or more disorders." Among
those who developed pathological gambling, 23.5% developed
pathological gambling before any other psychiatric problem, 74.3% of
respondents developed pathological gambling after experiencing other
psychiatric problems, and 2.2% developed pathological gambling and
other psychiatric problems at about the same time.
The study authors also found that respondents with other
psychiatric disorders were 17.4 times more likely to develop patho-
logical gambling than those without such problems." Substance use
disorders, in particular, were significantly elevated among participants
with pathological gambling; that is, 76.3% met criteria for any
substance use disorder, 46.2% met criteria for alcohol or drug abuse,
31.8% met criteria for alcohol or drug dependence, and 63.0% met
criteria for nicotine dependence." The study authors formally
concluded that pathological gambling is a "comparatively rare, [but]
seriously impairing, and undertreated disorder whose symptoms
typically start during early adulthood and is frequently secondary to
other mental or substance disorders that are associated with both
[pathological gambling] onset and persistence."'
A second, important line of research investigates how and why
individuals develop gambling disorders. Family history studies, in
particular, have been helpful in investigating the inheritance of
disorders such as gambling disorder. In a study published in 2006,
scientists at the University of Iowa College of Medicine and the
Indiana University School of Medicine investigated whether
pathological gambling (the term then in effect under the DSM-IV-TR)
is familial.82 To that end, the study authors recruited thirty-one case
probands" diagnosed with pathological gambling under the DSM-IV
and thirty-one control probands and conducted in-depth interviews of
them and their first-degree relatives (FDRs).'
77. Id. at 1356-57.
78. Id. at 1357.
79. Id.
80. Id
81. Id. at l351.
82. Donald W Black et al., A Family Study of Pathological Gambling, 141
PSYCHuATRY REs. 295, 295 (2006).
83. A proband is an individual affected with a disorder who is the first subject in a
study (as of a genetic character in a family lineage). See, e.g., Proband Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DIcrlONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/proband (last
visited Oct. 25, 2014).
84. Black et al., supm note 82, at 295.
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The study authors found that "[t]he lifetime rates of [pathological
gambling] and 'any gambling disorder' were significantly greater
among the [FDRs] of case probands (8.3% and 12.4%, respectively)
than among the control [FDRs] (2.1% and 3.5%, respectively)."' That
is, the study authors reported a rate of 8.3% for pathological gambling
and 12.4% for any gambling disorder among the FDRs of pathological
gamblers, compared to only 2.1% and 3.5%, respectively, among the
control group." The study authors also found that pathological
gambling FDRs had significantly higher lifetime rates of alcohol
disorders, "any substance use disorder," antisocial personality disorder,
and "any mental disorder."" Finally, the study authors found that "any
gambling disorder," alcohol disorder, and "any substance use disorder"
remained significant even after a conservative Bonferroni correction."
The study authors formally concluded that gambling disorders are
familial and coaggregate with substance misuse." The results of this
study are significant: demonstrating that pathological gambling runs
in families is the first step toward identifying specific genes that could
lead to the development of prevention and treatment strategies.90
A third, important line of research uses functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to study changes in blood oxygenation that
occur in the brain when individuals see gambling cues or otherwise
participate in gambling activities." In preparing one of the first
85. Id.
86. Id. at 295, 299.
87. Id.
88. Id. In statistics, the Bonferroni correction is a method used to counteract the
problem of multiple comparisons. More specifically, the "correction is used to reduce the
chances of obtaining false-positive results .. . when multiple pair wise tests are performed on
a single set of data." It is considered the simplest and most conservative method to control
the family wise error rate. See, eg., Matthew A. Napierala, What Is the Bonefenomi
Corection?, AM. ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS (Apr. 2012), http://www.aaos.org/news/
aaosnow/aprl 2/research7.asp.
89. Black et al., supra note 82, at 295; Research & Resources, supra note 68, at 11.
90. Black et al., supra note 82, at 295; Jennifer Brown, Pathological Gambling Runs
in Families, lowANow (June 17, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.now.uiowa.edu/2014/06/
pathological-gambling-runs-families.
91. See, eg., David N. Crockford et al., Cue-lnduced Brain Activity in Pathological
Gambler, 58 BIOLOGICAL PsYCHIATRY 787, 791-92 (2005) ("Pathological gambling subjects
in comparison with matched control subjects exhibited increased activity in the right DLPFC
[(dorsolateral prefontal cortex)], right parahippocampal region, and left occipital cortex when
exposed to visual gambling sensory cues. Findings were associated with a significantly
greater baseline craving and mean change in craving for gambling in [pathological gambling]
subjects despite the stimuli not specifically matching their preferred game(s) of choice.
Pathological gambling subjects activated the dorsal visual processing stream in response to
viewing a [video lottery terminal] being played, whereas control subjects activated the ventral
visual processing stream when viewing gambling venues. Brain regions of activation in
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neuroimaging studies of pathological gambling (ultimately published
in 2003), scientists from Yale University School of Medicine,
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, and the Connecticut
Council on Problem Gambling knew that gambling urges in
pathological gambling (the term then in effect under the DSM-IV-TR)
often immediately precede engagement in self-destructive gambling
behavior." The scientists believed "[a]n improved understanding of the
neural correlates of gambling urges in [pathological gambling] would
advance [an] understanding of the brain mechanisms underlying
[pathological gambling] and would help direct research into effective
treatments."3 The scientists, therefore, designed an fMiRI study that
"assess[ed] brain function during viewing of videotaped scenarios with
gambling, happy, or sad content."94 "Participants [were asked to] rate[]
the quality and magnitude of their emotional [responses] and
motivational responses."" After analyzing the data, the study authors
found that male participants with pathological gambling reported
"greater gambling urges after viewing [the] gambling scenarios
[versus] control subjects [although] [t]he groups did not differ
significantly in their subjective responses to the happy ... or sad ...
videotapes.""
The study authors concluded: "In men with [pathological
gambling], . . . cue presentation elicits gambling urges and leads to a
temporally dynamic pattern of brain activity changes in frontal,
paralimbic, and limbic brain structures. When viewing gambling cues,
[pathological gambling] subjects demonstrate relatively decreased
activity in brain regions implicated in impulse regulation compared
with controls."" The study authors further concluded that their
"finding of distinct patterns of neural responses to gambling-related
stimuli that are unique from those to other internal (emotional) states
has direct clinical implications and provides a basis for future
[pathological gambling] subjects compared with control subjects predominantly involved
regions believed to represent the DLPFC network. Together the findings suggest that visual
gambling sensory cues are preferentially recognized by [pathological gambling] subjects as
being salient for attention, reward expectancy, and behavior planning for attaining rewards."
(citation omitted)).
92. Marc N. Potenza et al., Gambling Uges in Pathological Gambling: A Functional
Magnetic Resonance lrnagig Study, 60 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 828 (2003).
93. Id. at 828.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
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experimentation in the prevention and treatment of [pathological
gambling]."98
In a second neuroimaging study published two years earlier, in
2001, scientists from Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard
Medical School, Concordia University, and Princeton University used
fMRI to monitor the brain activity of individuals without gambling
disorder who played games of chance where money was at stake."
The study authors reported that the brain activations of individuals
who anticipate winning money in gambling-like scenarios are very
similar to the brain activations of individuals who use cocaine." The
study authors specifically concluded, "The overlap of the observed
activations with those seen previously in response to ... euphoria-
inducing drugs is consistent with a contribution of common circuitry
to the processing of diverse rewards.""' The study results are
important because they suggest that treatments for individuals with
drug addiction may work for individuals with gambling disorder. 02
A fourth line of research investigates the efficacy of therapies and
social interventions, including behavioral therapies, pharmacological
therapies, and fellowship participation, for gambling disorder.' In a
study published in 2006, for example, scientists at the University of
Connecticut Health Center investigated the efficacy of cognitive and
cognitive-behavioral (CB) therapy for the treatment of gambling
disorder.'" As background, the study authors knew that Gamblers
Anonymous (GA) fellowship was the most popular gambling
intervention at the time of the study.o' However, the study authors also
knew that statistics showed that "less than 10% of [GA] attendees
98. Id. at 835.
99. Hans C. Breiter et al., Functonal Imaging of Neural Responses to Expectancy
and Experience ofMonetary Gains andLosses, 30 NEURON 619 (2001).
100. Research & Resources, supra note 68, at 11; see Breiter et al., supra note 99, at
634 ("These common patterns of hemodynamic response are consistent with the view that
dysfunction of neural mechanisms and psychological processes crucial to adaptive decision
making and behavior may contribute to a broad range of impulse disorders such as drug
abuse and compulsive gambling.").
101. Breiter et al., supra note 99, at 619.
102. Reseawrh & Resouwres, supra note 68, at 11.
103. See, e.g., PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A CLINICAL GUIDE TO TREATMENT 169-205
(Jon E. Grant & Marc N. Potenza eds., 2004) (reviewing studies investigating the efficacy of
cognitive and behavioral treatments for gambling disorder in chapter 12 and pharmacological
treatments for gambling disorder in chapter 13); NANcY M. PETRY, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING:
ETIOLOGY, COMORmDITY, AND TREATMENT 137-226 (2005) (reviewing research on
interventions for gambling disorder).
104. Nancy M. Petry et al., Cognidve-Behavioral Therapy for Pathological Gamblets
74 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 555 (2006).
105. Id. at 555.
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[were] actively involved in the fellowship" and that overall gambling
abstinence rates remained low.'" The purpose of the University of
Connecticut Health Center study, then, "was to evaluate the efficacy of
a short-term, CB treatment ... and compare its efficacy to a real-world
control condition," that is, referral to GA.'o7
To that end, the study authors recruited 231 "[i]ndividuals who
met [DSM-IV] criteria for pathological gambling, had gambled in the
past 2 months, were 18 years or older, and could read at the 5th grade
level."' 8 The study authors randomly assigned the participants to one
of three study arms: (1) referral to GA, (2) referral to GA plus a self-
directed CB workbook, or (3) referral to GA plus eight sessions of
individual CB therapy."' The study authors then assessed gambling
and related problems at baseline, one month later, posttreatment, and at
six and twelve months posttreatment."' The study authors found that
participants who were assigned to the third arm (i.e., participants who
received in-person, professional CB therapy while enrolled in GA)
made significantly more progress in modifying their gambling
behaviors than participants who only attended GA (i.e., participants in
the first arm) or who attended GA and used a self-directed CB therapy
workbook (i.e., participants in the second arm).' Although the study
authors recognized that additional studies would be required to more
fully investigate the costs, benefits, and efficacy of CB therapy, their
data does suggest efficacy of individual CB therapy in treating
individuals with gambling disorder."2
In addition to behavioral therapies, scientists are also
investigating the efficacy of several classes of drugs, including opioid
antagonists, serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and mood stabilizers, for the
treatment of gambling disorder."' In a detailed review essay published
in 2006, for example, two University of Minnesota scientists
summarized then-current study results investigating the efficacy of
opioid-receptor antagonists, serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and mood
stabilizers for the treatment of gambling disorder."' Several of the
106. Id
107. Id.
108. Id. at 556 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 555.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 563-64.
112. Id. at 565.
113. Research & Resources, supra note 68, at 13.
114. See Jon E. Grant & Suck Won Kim, Medication Management of Pathological
Gambling, MINN. MED., Sept. 2006, at 44.
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studies reviewed demonstrated the efficacy of pharmacological
therapies for the treatment of gambling disorder.
For example, in a study published in 2001, scientists from the
University of Minnesota Medical School and the Sungkyunkwan
University School of Medicine wanted "to assess the efficacy and
tolerability of naltrexone in the treatment of pathologic gambling," the
term then in effect under the DSM-IV-TR."' The study authors
therefore conducted a 1-week, single-blind placebo lead-in followed by
an 11 -week, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of naltrexone,
analyzing data relating to 45 subjects who were pathological
gamblers."' At the end of the study, 75% of the participants taking
naltrexone were "much" or "very much" improved on both the patient-
rated Clinical Global Impression and clinician-rated Clinical Global
Impression scales, compared with only 24% of those on placebo."'7
The study authors stated, "Results suggest that naltrexone is effective
in reducing the symptoms of pathologic gambling"; however, the study
authors also cautioned that their results should be interpreted
cautiously until further studies corroborate their findings and given the
identified side effects of naltrexone."'
Other scientists have investigated the efficacy of nalmefene,
another opioid antagonist, in the treatment of pathological gambling.
In one illustrative study published in 2006, scientists from the
University of Minnesota, Yale University, Mount Sinai School of
Medicine, Washington University School of Medicine, and Bio-Tie
Therapies Corporation in Finland studied the efficacy and tolerability
of nalmefene for treating adult disordered gamblers."' In "[a] 16-
week, randomized, dose-ranging, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial
... conducted at 15 outpatient treatment centers across the United
States between March 2002 and April 2003," researchers randomly
assigned 207 participants diagnosed with pathological gambling under
the DSM-IV-TR to receive nalmefene at doses of 25 mg/day, 50
mg/day, or 100 mg/day, or to receive a placebo.'20 The study authors
formally concluded that low doses of nalmefene may be an effeciive
115. Suck Won Kim et al., Double-Blind Naltrexone and Placebo Comparison Study
in the Treatnent ofPathological Gamblhng, 49 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 914, 914 (2001).
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id.
119. Jon E. Grant et al., MulcenterInvestdaon of the OpioidAntagonistNakmefene
in the Treatnent ofPathological Gamblig, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 303 (2006).
120. Id at 303.
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treatment for individuals with gambling disorder, although high doses
appear to produce intolerable side effects.'
These studies are illustrative, not exhaustive, examples of types of
ongoing gambling disorder research studies.122 Given the advances in
the scientific understanding of gambling disorder identified in these
and other research studies, the question becomes whether distinctions
between gambling disorder and other health conditions that are
embedded in health insurance laws and policies, disability income
insurance benefits laws and policies, and federal and state
antidiscrimination laws are scientifically supportable. A review of the
legal distinctions between gambling disorder and other health
conditions follows in Parts IV through VI. Part VII argues that these
legal distinctions are not supportable.
IV. HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OF GAMBLING DISORDER
TREATMENTS
Many health insurance policies and plans exclude treatments and
services for gambling disorder from insurance coverage. A quick
Google search reveals that Wellmark South Dakota's Blue Priority
HSA Plan still excludes pathological gambling from coverage.' The
2013-2014 Student Injury & Sickness Insurance Plan for students
attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida also
specifically excludes treatments and services for gambling from
coverage. 2 4 The health plan of the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center similarly excludes from coverage treatments for gambling
121. Id. at 311.
122. More complete reviews of gambling disorder research may be found at
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A CLINICAL GUIDE TO TREATMENT, supm note 103, at 169-205
(reviewing studies investigating the efficacy of cognitive and behavioral treatments for
gambling disorder in chapter 12 and pharmacological treatments for gambling disorder in
chapter 13); PETRY, supm note 103, at 137-226 (reviewing research on interventions for
gambling disorder); Research & Resources, supm note 68, at 6-19.
123. See Blue Pnonty HSA Health Plans for Individuals and Families: Blue Select
HSA-Qualified PPO Plans, WELLMARK S.D. 9 (2012), http://www.wellmark.com/South
DakotaPlans/OOC/BluePriorityHSAM31118_10_12.pdf (excluding certain mental health
and chemical dependency services, including "[i]mpulse-control disorders (such as
pathological gambling)").
124. See 2013-2014 Student Injury and Sickness Insurance Plan, UNITED HEALTHCARE
16, https://www.uhcsr.com/uhcsrBrochures/Public/ClientBrochures/2013-735-2-3%2OBro
chure-v3-NOC%203.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (excluding coverage for "treatment,
services or supplies for ... [a]ddiction, such as: nicotine addiction, except as specifically
provided in the policy and caffeine addiction; non-chemical addiction, such as: gambling,
sexual, spending, shopping, working and religious; codependency").
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disorder.' As a result of these types of exclusions, many individuals
are forced to pay for gambling treatments out of their own pockets or
must limit their treatment to free twelve-step programs such as
Gamblers Anonymous or state-funded treatments.'16
Although many states have enacted parity laws designed to put
mental health conditions on equal footing with physical health
conditions, some of these parity laws specifically exclude gambling
disorder from protection.'27 New Mexico's parity law, for example,
requires group health plans in New Mexico to provide "mental health
benefits" (and to provide them at parity with "medical and surgical
benefits"); 28 however, the New Mexico law specifically excludes
treatments for gambling addiction from the definition of "mental
health benefits."29 Similarly, Nevada's mental health parity law
requires the provision of insurance benefits for certain "severe mental
illness[es]," defined to include schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, and
obsessive-compulsive disorder.' Individuals who have gambling
125. See Exclusions; UPMC HEALTH PLAN 1, http://www.upmchealthplan.com/pdf/
Exclusions.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014) (excluding from insurance coverage "[t]welve step
model programs as sole therapy for conditions, including, but not limited to ... addictive
gambling").
126. Fial RepoA NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION (Aug. 3, 1999),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/ (select "Final report"; then select "Full Report"; then
scroll down and select "Chapter 4. Problem and Pathological Gambling"); see also About Us,
GAMBLERS ANONYMOUS, http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/ga/content/about-us (last
visited Oct. 25, 2014) ("Gamblers Anonymous is a fellowship of men and women who share
their experience, strength and hope with each other that they may solve their common
problem and help others to recover from a gambling problem. The only requirement for
membership is a desire to stop gambling. There are no dues or fees for Gamblers
Anonymous membership; we are self-supporting through our own contributions.").
127. Nancy Bateman, BehavioralHealthcareParity, NAT'LASS'N Soc. WORKERS (Apr.
2000), http://www.naswdc.org/practice/behavioral health/behavioral.asp ("New Mexico's
parity legislation provides coverage for all mental health, but excludes coverage for substance
abuse and gambling.").
128. N.M. STAT. § 59A-23E-18(A) (2013) ("A group health plan ... shall provide both
medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits. The plan shall not impose treatment
limitations or financial requirements on the provision of mental health benefits if identical
limitations or requirements are not imposed on coverage of benefits for other conditions.").
129. Id. § 59A-23E-18(F) (defining "mental health benefits" as "mental health
benefits as described in the group health plan, or group health insurance offered in
connection with the plan; but [not including] benefits with respect to treatment of substance
abuse, chemical dependency or gamblhig addictiol (emphasis added)).
130. NEv. REv. STAT. § 689A.0455(l)-(2) (2014) (requiring certain health insurance
policies to provide coverage for the treatment of conditions relating to "severe mental illness,"
and defining "severe mental illness" as "any of the following mental illnesses that are
biologically based and for which diagnostic criteria are prescribed in the most recent edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American
Psychiatric Association: (a) Schizophrenia[,] (b) Schizoaffective disorder[,] (c) Bipolar
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disorder, which is not included in Nevada's definition of "severe
mental illness," do not benefit from these state-mandated health
insurance benefits.
In an attempt to remedy the patchwork of state mental health
parity laws and to counter the historically inferior health insurance
benefits available to individuals with mental health conditions, the
federal government took its first step towards establishing mental
health parity on September 26, 1996, when President Bill Clinton
signed the federal Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) into law.'" As
originally enacted, MHPA prohibited large group health plans that
offered medical and surgical benefits as well as mental health benefits
from imposing more stringent lifetime and annual spending limits on
their offered mental health benefits.'32  For example, MHPA would
have prohibited a large group health plan from imposing a $20,000
annual cap or a $100,000 lifetime cap on mental health care if the plan
had no annual or lifetime caps for medical and surgical care or if the
plan had higher caps, such as a $50,000 annual cap or a $500,000
lifetime cap, for medical and surgical care.'
The problem with MHPA was that its application and scope were
very limited. As originally enacted, MHPA did not apply to the group
health plans of "small employers," which it further defined as those
"who employed an average of at least 2 but not more than 50
employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and
who employ[] at least 2 employees on the first day of the plan year." 34
MHPA also did not apply to individual health plans, the Medicare
Program, Medicaid nonmanaged care plans, or any self-funded,
nonfederal governmental plan whose sponsor opted out of MHPA.'"
Finally, MHPA contained an "increased cost" exemption for covered
group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection
with such plans if the application of MHPA resulted in an increase in
disorder[,] (d) Major depressive disorders[,] (e) Panic disorder[, and] (f) Obsessive-
compulsive disorder").
131. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA), Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat.
2944, § § 701-702 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1 185a (2012)).
132. Seeid. § 702(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1185a.
133. Secid.
134. See id. § 702 (applying in each case to "a group health plan (or health insurance
coverage offered in connection with such a plan)").
135. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(A) (2012) (permitting sponsors of self-
insured nonfederal governmental health plans to opt out of particular federal requirements);
45 C.ER. § 146.180(a)(1) (2013) (permitting sponsors of self-insured nonfederal govern-
mental health plans to opt out of federal mental health parity requirements).
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the cost under the plan of at least 1%."' By November 1998, over two
years after MHPA's enactment, only four plans across the United States
had obtained exemptions due to cost increases of 1% or more.'"
In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPA was neither a
mandated offer nor a mandated benefits law; that is, nothing in MHPA
required a large group health plan to actually offer or provide any
mental health benefits.' Thus, health plans were free after the
enactment of MHPA to simply not provide any benefits for gambling
disorder or any other mental health condition.' As originally enacted,
MHPA also was not a comprehensive parity law because it expressly
excluded from protection individuals with substance use and addictive
disorders, such as alcohol use disorder and other drug use disorders.'40
(MHPA did not specifically mention gambling disorder one way or
another.) In addition, MHPA did not require parity between medical
and surgical benefits and mental health benefits in terms of
deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, inpatient day limitations, or
outpatient visit limitations. 4
Because of these limitations, President George W Bush expanded
MHPA twelve years later by signing into law the Paul Wellstone and
Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008
(MHiPAEA).142  MHPAEA built on MHPA by expressly protecting
individuals with substance-related and addictive disorders and by
imposing comprehensive parity requirements on large group health
plans.143  In particular, MHPAEA provided that any financial
136. MHPA § 702(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1185a.
137. See Colleen L. Barry, The Political Evolution of Mental Health Panty, 14 HARV.
REV. PSYCHIATRY 185, 187 (2006).
138. See MHPA § 702(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1185a ("Nothing in this section shall be
construed ... as requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in
connection with such a plan) to provide any mental health benefits. . .
139. Seeid
140. See id § 702(a) ("The term 'mental health benefits' means benefits with respect
to mental health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case may
be), but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse or chemical
dependency.").
141. See id ("Nothing in this section shall be construed ... as affecting the terms and
conditions (including cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and
requirements relating to medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration, or scope of
mental health benefits under the plan or coverage. . . .").
142. See Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction
Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881, §§ 511-512 (codified
in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
143. Seeid. § 512(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § I 185a (adding a new definition of "substance use
disorder benefits"); id. § 512(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (regulating the financial requirements
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requirements (including deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and
other out-of-pocket expenses)'" and treatment limitations (including
inpatient day limitations and outpatient visit limitations)145 that large
group health plans imposed on mental health and substance use
disorder benefits must not be any more restrictive than the
predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations imposed
by the plan on substantially all medical and surgical benefits.146
MHPAEA thus would have prohibited large group health plans from
imposing higher deductibles, copayments, or coinsurances, or lower
inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, on individuals seeking
care for gambling disorder or any other mental health or substance use
disorder listed in the current edition of the DSM or the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD).'47
As originally enacted, MIHAEA did not apply to the group
health plans of "small employers," which it, like MiHPA, defined as
those "who employed an average of at least 2 .. . but not more than 50
employees on business days during the preceding calendar year."'48
MHPAEA, like MIHPA, also did not apply to individual health plans,
the Medicare Program, Medicaid nonmanaged care plans, or any self-
funded, nonfederal governmental plans whose sponsors had opted out
of MIHPAEA.'49 In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPAEA also
and treatment limitations that are applied to both mental health and substance use disorder
benefits).
144. See id. § 512(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (including within the definition of
"financial requirements" deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).
145. See id. (including within the definition of "[treatment limitation ... limits on the
frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other similar limits on the
scope or duration of treatment").
146. See id (requiring both financial requirements and treatment limitations
applicable to mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more restrictive than
the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations applied to substantially all
physical health benefits covered by the plan).
147. See, eg., Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008; Technical Amendment to External Review for
Multi-State Plan Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,286 (Nov. 13, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 146.136) ("Any condition defined by the plan or coverage as being or as not being a mental
health condition must be defined to be consistent with generally recognized independent
standards of current medical practice (for example, the most current version of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the most current version of the ICD, or
State guidelines).").
148. MHPAEA § 512, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (applying only to group health plans or
health insurance coverage offered in connection with such plans).
149. Colleen L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and
Addiction Insurance Panty, 88 MILBANK Q. 404, 407 (2010) (explaining that the MHPAEA
"applies to Medicare Advantage coverage offered through a group health plan, Medicaid
managed care, the State Children's Health Insurance Program, and state and local government
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was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefits law; that is,
nothing in MIHPAEA required a covered group health plan to actually
offer or provide any gambling disorder benefits or other mental health
benefits.'o Like MHPA, MIHPAEA also contained an "increased cost"
exemption for covered group health plans and health insurance
coverage offered in connection with such plans, but under MHPAEA
the amount of the required cost increase increased, at least for the first
year."' That is, a covered plan that could demonstrate a cost increase
of at least 2% in the first plan year and 1% in each subsequent plan
year of the actual total costs of coverage with respect to medical and
surgical benefits and mental health and substance use disorder benefits
would be eligible for an exemption from MHPAEA for such year.'52
MHPAEA required determinations of exemption-qualifying cost
increases to be made and certified in writing by a qualified and
plans," but not to Medicaid nonmanaged care plans); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for
Medicaid & State Operations, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to State Health Officials,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Nov. 4, 2009), http://downloads.cms.gov/
cmsgov/archived-downloads/SMDL/downloads/SHOl 10409.pdf ("The MHPAEA require-
ments apply to Medicaid only insofar as a State's Medicaid agency contracts with one or
more managed care organizations (MCOs) or Prepaid Inpatient Health Plans (PIHPs), to
provide medical/surgical benefits as well as mental health or substance use disorder
benefits.... MHPAEA parity requirements do not apply to the Medicaid State plan if a State
does not use MCOs or PIHPs to provide these benefits."); see The Center for Consumer
Information & Insurance Oversight: The Mental Health Pamty and Addiction Equity Act,
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-
Initiatives/Other-Insurance-Protections/mhpaeafactsheet.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2014)
("MHPAEA does not apply directly to small group health plans .... Non-Federal
governmental employers that provide self-funded group health plan coverage to their
employees (coverage that is not provided through an insurer) may elect to exempt their plan
(opt-out) from the requirements of MHPAEA .... Medicare, Medicaid ... are not ...
issuers of health insurance. They are public health plans through which individuals obtain
health coverage. However, ... Medicaid benchmark benefit plans ... require compliance
with certain requirements of MHPAEA.").
150. SeeMHPAEA § 512(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1 185a (regulating only those group health
plans that offer both physical health and mental health benefits); Implementation of the
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/health-fmancing/implementation-mental-health-
parity-addiction-equity-act (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) ("Self-insured non-federal government
employee plans can opt out of the federal parity law. The requirements of parity do not apply
to: [s]mall employer plans created before March 23, 2010 ... [;] [c]hurch-sponsored plans
and self-insured plans sponsored by state and local governments[;] [rietiree-only plans[;]
TriCare[;] Medicare[;] [t]raditional Medicaid (fee-for-service, non-managed care."); The
Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight: The Mental Health Panty and
Addiction Equity Ac supm note 149 (noting some of the same limitations).
151. See MHPAEA § 512(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (establishing new cost exemption
provisions).
15 2. Id.
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licensed actuary in good standing with the American Academy of
Actuaries.'"
Before President Obama signed the health care reform bill into
law, then, gambling disorder and other mental health insurance
benefits were regulated by MHPA-as expanded by MHPAEA-and
more stringent state law.'" That is, unless a more stringent state law
required a health plan to provide gambling disorder benefits (which
state law usually did not), a health plan was not required to provide
gambling disorder benefits.
In late March 2010, President Obama responded to this limitation
by signing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) into
law (as consolidated, commonly known as the Affordable Care Act
(ACA)).'" Best known for its controversial individual health insurance
mandate,' ACA has two sets of provisions that relate to mental health
parity and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder
benefits. Upheld by the United States Supreme Court on June 28,
2012,'" these two sets of provisions eliminate some of the limitations
of MIHPA and MHPAEA.
The first set of ACA provisions extends MHPA's and MHPAEA's
mental health parity provisions to the individual and small group
health plans offered on and off the health insurance exchanges.' Now,
153. Id.
154. See Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455, 461-78 (2011) (describing the patchwork of state mental health
parity law and providing examples of state laws that are more and less stringent than federal
law).
155. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42
U.S.C.).
156. Id. § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) ("An applicable individual shall for each
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual
who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such
month.").
157. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
158. ACA§ 1311(j), 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012) ("[MHPAEA] shall apply to qualified
health plans in the same manner and to the same extent as such section applies to health
insurance issuers and group health plans."); id § 1562(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26
(identifying the conforming and technical changes that will be made to former 42 U.S.C.
300gg-5 (current 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26)); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (noting in the "prior
provisions" section that former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 was transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
26); see also Essential Health Benefits Bulletin, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/essential
health benefits bulletin.pdf ("The Affordable Care Act also specifically extends MHPAEA
to the individual market.").
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many individual and small group health plans that previously
discriminated against individuals with gambling disorder and other
mental health conditions through higher deductibles, copayments, and
coinsurance rates, as well as lower inpatient day limitations and
outpatient visit limitations, must comply with MIHPA and MHPAEA.'"
The second set of relevant ACA provisions requires certain health
plans to actually provide mental health and substance use disorder
benefits. That is, the ACA now requires individual and small group
health plans,"' exchange-offered qualified health plans,"' state basic
health plans,162 and Medicaid benchmark plans"' to offer "[m]ental
health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health
treatment[s]" in addition to nine other categories of essential health
benefits (EHBs)." Unfortunately, not every individual with health
insurance will benefit from these ten required EHB categories because
grandfathered health plans, large group health plans, and self-insured
health plans are exempt from the requirement to provide the ten EHB
categories."'
159. See supra text accompanying note 158.
160. ACA § 1201, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg-5 (noting amendments to the Public
Health Service Act § 2707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a)).
161. Id. § 1301(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1).
162. Individuals eligible for state basic health plan coverage include individuals who
are not eligible for Medicaid and whose household income falls between 133% and 200% of
the federal poverty line for the family involved as well as low-income legal resident
immigrants. Id. § 1331(e), 42 U.S.C. § 18051.
163. Id § 2001(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5).
164. Id. § 1302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18022.
165. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage
Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,562-63 (June 17, 2010) (noting amendments to
29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a), which defines "grandfathered health plan coverage" as
"coverage provided by a group health plan, or a health insurance issuer, in which an
individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010"); id at 34,559 (explaining that section 2707 of
the Public Health Service Act does not apply to grandfathered health plans); id at 34,563
(noting amendments to 29 C.ER. § 2590.715-125 1(c)(1), which states that "the provisions of
PHS Act section[] . .. 2707 . . . do not apply to grandfathered health plans"); Applicadon of
the New Health Reform Provisions ofPartA of Title XXVII ofthe PHSAct to Grandfathered
Plans, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB. 1, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/grandfatherregtable.pdf (last
visited Oct. 26, 2014) (explaining that ACA's essential benefits package requirement is not
applicable to grandfathered plans); Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum & Katherine Hayes,
The Essential Health Benefits Provisions of the Affordable Care Act: Implications for People
with Disabilities, COMMONWEALTH FuND 3 (Mar. 2011), http://www.commonwealthfund.
org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/201 1/mar/1485_rosenbaumessential_hit_benefits_
provisions acadisabilitiesreformibrief.v2.pdf ("The act exempts large-group health plans,
as well as self-insured ERISA plans and ERISA-governed multiemployer welfare
arrangements not subject to state insurance law, from the essential benefit requirements.");
see CHERYL ULMER ET AL., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST
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For those health plans that must provide benefits within the ten
EHB categories, the statutory EHB requirements are unclear as to
whether particular benefits, such as gambling disorder benefits, are
required. As a result, the federal Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) issued final regulations implementing ACA's EHB
requirements (Final Regulations) on February 25, 2013.166 These Final
Regulations permit states to select a benchmark plan.. that provides
coverage for the ten EHB categories, including mental health and
substance use disorder services,' that will serve as a reference plan for
health plans in the state. According to the Final Regulations, health
plans in the state that are required to provide the ten EHB categories
shall provide health benefits that are substantially equal to those
provided by the state's benchmark plan, including the benchmark
plan's covered benefits and excluded benefits.'
Thus, the question of whether a particular health insurance policy
or plan must provide gambling disorder benefits after the ACA
requires an analysis of whether the plan is required to provide the ten
EHB categories as well as the content of each state's selected
benchmark plan. Given the popularity of gaming in Las Vegas, let us
begin with an analysis of the benchmark plan selected by the state of
Nevada. The state of Nevada selected the Health Plan of Nevada Point
of Service Group 1 C XV 500 HCR Plan (Nevada Benchmark Plan) as
its benchmark plan.'o If, as written on March 31, 2012, the Nevada
Benchmark Plan included gambling disorder benefits, then individual,
small group, and other health plans in the state of Nevada that are
required to provide the ten EHB categories could have to provide
gambling disorder benefits in years 2014 and 2015."' On the other
1-8 to -10 (2012), available at http://nap.edulopenbook.php?recordid=13234 (listing the
health plan settings to which ACA's EHB requirement do not apply).
166. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,836 (Feb. 25, 2013)
(codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155-156 (2013)).
167. Id. at 12,866 (adopting 45 C.ER. § 156.100).
168. Id. (adopting 45 C.ER. § 156.110(a)(5)).
169. Id at 12,867 (adopting 45 C.ER. § 156.115(a)).
170. See Letter from Scott J. Kipper, Comm'r of Ins., Div. of Ins., State of Nev., to
Sec'y Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., NEv DivisioN INS. (Dec. 14,
2012), http://doi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-documents/Healthcare-Reform/l2.14.
12_kipperjletter reehb.pdf (identifying Nevada's benchmark plan selection); Nevada ERB
Benchmark Plan, NEv DivisIoN INS., http://doi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-
documents/Healthcare-Reform/nevada-ehb-benchmark-plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
171. See E-mail from Glenn Shippey, Nev. Div. of Ins., to author (Oct. 2, 2013, 4:12
PM) (on file with author) (explaining the application of the EHB requirements in the state of
Nevada).
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hand, if the Nevada Benchmark Plan did not include gambling disorder
benefits on March 31, 2012, then gambling disorder benefits would
not be essential health benefits in the state of Nevada, and individuals
such as Gary in this Article's opening hypothetical will not have such
benefits in years 2014 and 2015 unless their health plans voluntarily
include such benefits.'72
On March 31, 2012, the Nevada Benchmark Plan included
coverage for outpatient and inpatient treatment of substance-related
conditions, including alcohol use disorder and the drug use disorders."'
On March 31, 2012, however, the Nevada Benchmark Plan excluded
coverage for a class of mental health conditions known as the "impulse
control disorders."'74  Because the then-current (2012) edition of the
DSM, the DSM-IV-TR, classified "pathological gambling" as an
impulse control disorder, the Nevada Benchmark Plan excludes
coverage for treatments for gambling disorders, at least for years 2014
and 2015. That is, in years 2014 and 2015, Nevada residents will not
benefit from any mandatory gambling disorder benefits and will only
have them to the extent that their health plans voluntarily provide
gambling disorder benefits. A quick Google search revealed that other
state benchmark plans, such as the Iowa Benchmark Plan,'7 also
exclude coverage of treatments for the impulse control disorders and,
therefore, treatments for gambling disorder.
Now, let us turn to the state of Louisiana, where Gary currently
lives. Louisiana's Benchmark Plan does not appear to exclude from
coverage treatments for the impulse control disorders generally or
gambling disorder specifically.'7  Only "counseling services[,] such as
career counseling, marriage counseling, divorce counseling, parental
counseling and job counseling[,] [and] [e]ducation services and
supplies[,] including training or re-training for a vocation," appear to
172. See Amanda Cassidy, Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFF. 2 (May 2, 2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brieflpdfs/healthpolicybrief9l.pdf (noting that
HHS has indicated that the benchmark plan approach may be changed in 2016 and in future
years based on evaluation and feedback).
173. See Nevada EBB Benchmark Plan, supm note 170, at 3, rows 26-27.
174. See E-mail from Glenn Shippey to author, supra note 171 (noting the Nevada
Benchmark Plan's exclusion of "[i]mpulse control disorders").
175. See Iowa EiB Benchmark Plan, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/iowa-ehb-benchmark-
plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (excluding coverage for inpatient and outpatient
treatments for impulse control disorders).
176. See Louisiana EB Benchmark Plan, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES 9-10, rows 24-25, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Down
loads/louisiana-ehb-benchmark-plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
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be excluded from the mental health benefits set forth in Louisiana's
Benchmark Plan."' As a result, health plans that are required by the
ACA to offer the ten EHB categories would be required to cover
gambling disorder benefits.
Returning to the hypothetical that opens this Article, remember
that Gary's mental health professional recommended that Gary
participate in a twenty-two-day residential treatment program located
on the Northshore of Lake Pontchartrain for individuals with gambling
disorder. Unfortunately, if Gary lived in Las Vegas, it is likely that his
health plan would exclude inpatient and outpatient treatments for
gambling disorder from coverage and that this exclusion would be
legally permissible given that the Nevada Benchmark plan excludes
treatments for the impulse control disorders from coverage. The result
is that Gary would not have private insurance coverage of gambling
disorder and would have to pay for the costs of his treatment out of his
own (now empty) pocket unless the state in which Gary lived provided
state-funded coverage for gambling treatments and Gary was able to
access those state-funded services."' In Gary's case, remember that he
spent his savings chasing gambling losses and has a heavily mortgaged
house located in an affluent neighborhood. The result is that unless
Gary can generate some other source of income or he lives in a state
that funds gambling treatment services, he likely will not obtain any
gambling treatments other than those provided through free twelve-
step programs such as Gamblers Anonymous."9 In Louisiana, on the
other hand, Gary's gambling disorder treatments would appear to be
covered by private health insurance policies that, under the ACA, must
comply with the essential health benefits requirements. As discussed
in more detail in Part VII, I propose that the Louisiana benchmark plan
177. Seeid at 10, row 25.
178. See, e g., Five Year Strategic Plan for Problem Gambling Treatment Serices
Witin the State of Nevada: Fiscal Years 2012-2016, NEv DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES (Apr. 29, 2011), http://dhhs.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/dhhsnvgov/content/Resources/
StatePlans/NVDHHSGamblingTreatmentStrategicPlan.pdf (providing information
regarding state-funded problem gambling treatment services in Nevada). Currently, Nevada
funds are paying for gambling treatments for individuals who have private insurance but
whose insurance refuses to cover gambling disorder. When insured individuals use these
limited state funds, less money is available for use by individuals with the most dire gambling
disorder needs, including those who lack employment, insurance coverage, or both. For
fiscal year 2014, approximately $900,000 of state funding was awarded to five gambling
treatment programs throughout Nevada. It is the hope of policy makers in Nevada that
private insurers will begin to cover gambling disorder, leaving the bulk of state funds for
uninsured individuals with gambling disorder who have the highest needs.
179. See About Us, supa note 126 ("There are no dues or fees for Gamblers
Anonymous membership; we are self-supporting through our own contributions.").
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be used as a model for revising the Nevada, Iowa, and other similar
benchmark plans.
V. DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR INDIVIDUALS
WITH GAMBLING DISORDER
Assume for the moment that Gary lives in Las Vegas and does
not have access to private gambling disorder health insurance benefits.
Unable to pay for his recommended gambling disorder treatment and
worried about his ability to pay his mortgage and support his family,
Gary explores other income options, including applying for public and
private disability income insurance benefits.' As background, Title II
of the Social Security Act (SSA) provides for the payment of federal
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits to certain
individuals with physical and mental disabilities."' The SSA defines
"disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment."' An applicant's impairment or impairments must be "of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy."" The applicant's impairment must have lasted or be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months, or be
expected to result in death.'"
The Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) has
established a five-step sequential evaluation for determining whether
an individual has a disability that qualifies for the receipt of SSDI
benefits.' First, a determination is made regarding whether the
180. Disability income insurance protects an individual's income. That is, if an
individual becomes unable to work due to a sickness or injury, disability income insurance
can provide cash benefits that the individual may use to pay a mortgage and other bills,
including expenses for food, clothing, and utilities. Designed to provide financial security
until the individual returns to work, disability income insurance typically pays a monthly cash
benefit after an initial waiting period that is equivalent to a percentage of the individual's
salary. See, eg., Disability Insuance, METLIFE (Apr. 2014), https://www.metlife.com/
individuallinsurance/disability-insurance/index.html#basics; Individual Disability Insurance,
METLIFE (Jan. 2014), https://www.metlife.com/individual/insurance/disability-insurance/
individual-disability-insurance.html#basics.
181. See, e.g., Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
183. Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
184. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
185. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (explaining the five-step
sequential evaluation process in the context of a particular claimant); 20 C.F.R.
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individual is engaged in "substantial gainful activity."'" If so, benefits
are denied.' Second, if the individual is not engaged in substantial
gainful activity, a determination is made regarding whether the
individual has a medically severe impairment or combination of
impairments.'" If the individual does not have a severe impairment or
combination of impairments, benefits are denied.' Third, if the
individual has a severe impairment, a determination is made regarding
whether the impairment meets or equals one of a number of "listed
impairments" in 20 C.ER. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1.'" If the
impairment meets or equals a "listed impairment," the individual is
conclusively presumed to have a disability."' Fourth, if the impairment
does not meet or equal a "listed impairment," a determination is made
regarding whether the impairment prevents the individual from
performing past relevant work.' If the individual can perform past
relevant work, benefits are denied.'93 Fifth, if the individual cannot
perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
show that the individual is able to perform other kinds of work.9 4 The
individual is entitled to SSDI benefits only if the person is unable to
perform other work.'
Neither Congress in the SSA, nor HHS in the SSA's
implementing regulations, expressly excludes individuals with
gambling disorder from qualifying for SSDI benefits.' Instead, SSDI
claimants with gambling disorder, like most other SSDI claimants, are
assessed using the case-by-case, five-step sequential evaluation
process.
§ 404.1520(a)(4) (2014) (listing the five-step sequential evaluation process); id.
§ 416.920(a)(4) (explaining the five-step sequential evaluation process).
186. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 138.
187. 20 CER. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
188. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140-41.
189. 20 C.ER. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
190. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141.
191. 20 C.ER. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
192. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142.
193. 20 CER. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
194. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142.
195. 20 C.ER. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
196. Under the 1996 amendments to the SSA, however, "[a]n individual shall not be
considered to be disabled ... if alcoholism or drug addiction would ... be a contributing
factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled." 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C) (2012) (establishing the exclusion); see Johansen v. Astrue, No. 10-
2076 (DWF/SER), 2011 WL 4583828, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2011) (referencing the
exclusion).
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Johansen v Astrue provides an illustrative review of an
application for SSDI benefits by an individual with gambling
disorder.' Tammy Lee Ann Johansen, who had worked in the past as
a court receptionist, had been diagnosed with gambling disorder in
addition to a number of other conditions, including depression,
obsessive compulsive disorder, substance abuse, attention deficit
disorder, and anxiety, that made her unable on some (but not all) days
to do housework, cook, read, or even leave her home.' To determine
whether Johansen was eligible to receive SSDI benefits, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) applied the five-step sequential
evaluation set forth in the HHS regulations.'" At step one, the ALJ
found that Johansen had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the onset of her illness on November 1, 2008." At step two, the
ALJ found that Johansen had severe impairments including
"pathological gambling disorder; major depressive disorder; attention
deficit disorder; anxiety; and a history of treatment for chemical
dependence." 201' At the third step, however, "the ALJ concluded that
none of [Johansen's] impairments or combination of impairments met
or equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.ER. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix l."202 That is, the ALJ determined, "Johansen had only mild
restrictions in the activities of daily living because she was able to do
some household activities, she could prepare meals, clean, do laundry
and go shopping."203 The ALJ also determined, "Johansen had
moderate restrictions in social functioning [and] moderate difficulties
with regard to concentration [and that she] had not had any periods of
decompensation."2' Because Johansen did not have an impairment
that was listed in the federal regulations and maintained her coping
mechanisms, the ALJ found that she did not satisfy the third step of the
analysis.205 At step four, the ALJ-giving significant weight to the
opinions of the state agency medical consultants-found that Johansen
"had the residual functional capacity ... to perform a full range of
work."20 At step five, the ALJ determined that although Johansen
197. No. 10-2076 (DWF/SER), 2011 WL 4583831 (D. Minn. Aug. 15,2011).
198. Id.at*1.
199. Id. at *9.
200. Id.
201. Id
202. Id at *10 (referencing 20 C.ER. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1).
203. Id
204. Id
205. Id
206. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
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could not perform her past relevant work as a court receptionist, she
"could perform work as a hand packager, a laundry worker, [or] as an
assembler, and that there were significant jobs in the national economy
that a person with [her] age, education, work experience, and [residual
functional capacity] could perform."20' As a result, the ALJ declined
Johansen's application for SSDI benefits.208
Johansen appealed. On appeal, the Commissioner upheld the
ALJ's findings.2" On review, the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota upheld the decision of the Commissioner.2 10
Other cases involving individuals with gambling disorder and other
comorbid disorders who have applied for SSDI benefits have had
similar results.211
The Johansen case involves an individual's application for federal
SSDI benefits. Many individuals such as Gary also have private
disability income insurance policies that provide short- and long-term
cash disability insurance benefits pursuant to the contractual language
set forth in their policies. One question is whether individuals with
gambling disorder are expressly excluded from disability income
insurance benefits under these private policies or whether they are
subject to an individualized disability assessment, such as that set forth
under federal law in the SSA. The answer depends on the contractual
language set forth in each private disability income insurance policy as
applied to the applicant who has gambling disorder. As a general
matter, research reveals that gambling disorder tends not to be
expressly excluded from the definition of disability in these private
policies.212 Research also reveals that individuals with gambling
disorder may not be successful in their claims for private disability
income insurance benefits if the reason for their loss of income
includes termination of employment due to a criminal or other illegal
207. Id.at*11.
208. Id.at*9-1l.
209. Id. at *1.
210. Id
211. See, eg., Gorton v. Astrue, No. 06-CV-4903 (PJS/JSM), 2008 WL 583703, at *4,
*27 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2008) (noting that a plaintiff with gambling disorder and other
comorbid physical and mental accidents and disorders, including a vehicle accident, scoliosis,
a depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, and a mixed personality disorder, applied for SSDI
benefits; the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota upheld the
Commissioner's denial of her benefits in part because the medical record evidence did not
support the plaintiff's subjective complaints).
212. See, eg., Disability Income Insurance-Nevada, STATE FARM, https://www.state
farm.com/insurance/disability/disability-income/nevada/ (last visited Oct. 26,2014).
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act.' However, they may be successful if they do not engage in
criminal or other illegal activities and can prove that their gambling
disorders caused their loss of income.
For example, in Reilly v Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Co., plaintiff Michael Reilly sought to receive monthly cash benefits
under his private disability income insurance policy issued by
defendant Northwestern Mutual.214 As background, Reilly was an
attorney with gambling disorder whose license to practice law was
revoked by the Iowa Supreme Court after he misappropriated over
$90,000 of a client's trust funds to pay for his own personal gambling
debts.' Benefits were payable under Reilly's disability income
insurance policy if "the Insured [became] disabled while [the] policy
[was] in force; the Insured [was] under the care of a licensed physician
other than himself [when he had the disability]; [the Insured's]
disability result[ed] from an accident or sickness; and [the Insured's]
disability [was not otherwise excluded under the policy].""
Gambling disorder was not specifically excluded from the
definition of disability under Reilly's policy.' Reilly thus argued that
his gambling disorder constituted a disabling "sickness," that he
developed this disabling sickness while his disability income insurance
policy was in effect, that he was under the care of a physician, and that
his sickness caused him to lose his license to practice law, thus
necessitating cash income benefits.' In opposition, defendant
Northwestern Mutual argued that it was not obligated to pay Reilly
cash benefits because Reilly's inability to perform his occupation
resulted not from an accident or sickness but, instead, from criminal or
other illegal conduct; that is, Reilly misappropriated his client's trust
fund account."'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
agreed with defendant Northwestern Mutual, citing analogous case
law holding that an insured's loss of income caused by a legal
consequence of the insured's behavior, such as the loss of the insured's
license to practice law that followed from the insured's misappro-
213. See genemily Justice System Guide, supm note 62, at 11 (discussing several legal
consequences of gambling disorder).
214. No. 1-06-CV-14-CRWRAW, 2007 WL 1485103, at *1 (S.D. Iowa May 16, 2007).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id
218. Id
219. Id. at *2.
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priation of client trust fund accounts, is not a disability.220 The court
ultimately found that Reilly "was not disabled by the gambling
addiction, only by the license revocation," pointing to the fact that
Reilly would still be practicing law with his full income,
"notwithstanding his excessive gambling, except for his wrongful
conversion of client funds.""' The court reasoned that the public
policy of the state of Iowa required such a finding.' The result might
have been different, however, had Reilly not testified at his license
revocation hearing that he had overcome his gambling disorder with
treatment.223 Indeed, the court went on to suggest that disability
benefits might be payable in situations in which the work life of a
professional is ended only by addiction, not by a license revocation or
other criminal or illegal act.224
This suggestion proved true in McClaugherty v Unum Life
Insurance Co. of Amenica.225  In McClaugherty, plaintiff John
McClaugherty sued Unum Life Insurance Company following its
denial of McClaugherty's application for short-term disability
benefits.226 McClaugherty had been diagnosed with gambling disorder
among other comorbid disorders, including bipolar affective disorder,
alcohol use disorder, and substance use disorder.227 McClaugherty had
not, however, engaged in any criminal or other illegal acts; instead, he
simply resigned from his employment in order to enter a treatment
center for his gambling disorder and other comorbid disorders. He
then applied for short-term cash disability benefits to pay for such
treatment.' Defendant Unum tried to argue that McClaugherty did
not have a disability within the meaning of the policy. On review, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
220. Id. at *2-3 (citing Mass. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Millstein, 129 F.3d 688 (2d Cir.
1997); Zembko v. Nw. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., No. 3:05CV918(AHN), 2007 WL 948323 (D.
Conn. Mar. 26,2007)).
221. Id. at *3.
222. Id. (quoting Milstem, 129 F3d at 691 ("[A) rule which would allow a lawyer to
steal from his clients, even when such theft occurs in the throes of a drug addiction, and then
recover disability benefits for income lost due to the [license] suspension resulting from such
theft, would be against public policy")).
223. Id. ("Plaintiff so testified at his license revocation hearing and by deposition;
treatment for his addiction had overcome his gambling habit.").
224. Id ("This is consistent with public policy that does not allow recovery on a
disability insurance policy when license revocation, not a treatable addiction, ends the work
life of a professional.").
225. No. 2:09-cv-01292, 2010 WL 2787632 (S.D. W Va. July 14,2010).
226. Id at*l.
227. Id.at*1-3.
228. Id.at*1.
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found that defendant Unum failed to consider important medical
record evidence showing that McClaugherty had received intensive
outpatient treatment for his gambling and comorbid disorders that
would corroborate McClaugherty's disability claim.2 9  The court
ultimately remanded the case, instructing defendant Unum to explicitly
consider a particular set of outpatient treatment records as evidence of
McClaugherty's disability.230
As discussed in more detail in Part VII, below, I approve of the
lack of express exclusions for gambling disorder that exist, and the
conduct of individualized assessments of disability that occur, in the
context of applications for public and private disability income
insurance. I further argue that federal and state health insurance laws,
state benchmark health plans, and federal and state antidiscrimination
laws should follow suit, removing express exclusions for gambling
disorder and conducting individualized assessments of eligibility for
individuals with gambling disorder.
VI. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS
WITH GAMBLING DISORDER
In the hypothetical that opens this Article, Gary seeks treatment
for gambling disorder and discovers that, in some states, health plans
may legally exclude gambling disorder treatments from coverage.
Gary then seeks cash disability income insurance benefits to pay for
his gambling treatment and his other living expenses, only to learn that
his misappropriation of client trust funds makes him ineligible for such
benefits. Gary then considers suing his old law firm for disability
discrimination based on the law firm's termination of his partnership
agreement. As discussed in more detail in this Part, Gary's gambling
disorder makes Gary ineligible for protected status under federal and
most states' antidiscrimination laws.
As background, a range of antidiscrimination protections and
accommodations are available to qualified individuals who have
physical and mental disabilities under a variety of federal and state
laws. Signed into law by President Richard Nixon on September 26,
1973, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits employers and
organizations that receive federal financial assistance from
discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified individuals
229. Id. at *4-5.
230. Id. at *5.
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with disabilities.23' The ADA, signed into law by President George
H.W Bush on July 26, 1990, also prohibits certain employers, state
and local government agencies, and places of public accommodation
from discriminating on the same basis.232 The ADAAA, signed into
law by President George W Bush on September 25, 2008, clarifies that
the ADA's definition of disability should be broadly construed in favor
of individuals with physical and mental impairments who seek
protection under the ADA and generally shall not require extensive
analysis.233 State laws such as the California Fair Housing and
Employment Act also provide individuals with protection from
harassment and discrimination in the contexts of housing and
employment because of physical or mental disability.234 One theme
underlying these federal and state statutes is that it is wrong to
discriminate against individuals because of their physical and mental
disabilities and that it is right to accommodate them to help them
participate more fully in society.235
To determine whether an individual such as Gary would be
entitled to protection under one of these statutes, each statute's
definition of "disability" must be examined.236 For example, the
original ADA defined a disability as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
231. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)) ("No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in
the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
232. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)).
233. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
234. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (2012).
235. See, eg., Timothy P Ward, Needing a Fix: Congress Should Amend the
Americans with Disabilties Act of 1990 To Remove a Record ofAddiction as a Protected
Disability, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 719 (2005) ("Implicit in Congress's legitimate goal of
protecting the disabled from discrimination is the idea that discrimination against disabled
persons is unfair because it is wrong to treat a person differently based on circumstances or
conditions over which he has no control.").
236. The definitions of "disability" that are used by the SSA and by private disability
income insurance benefit insurers, discussed supra Part V are different from the definitions
used by federal and state antidiscrimination laws and are not applicable here. See, e.g., Labit
v. Akzo-Nobel Salt, Inc., No. 99-30047, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000) (distinguishing Social
Security disability determinations from ADA disability determinations and noting, for
example, that "social security disability determinations do not take into account such
workplace accommodations").
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regarded as having such an impairment."3' The regulations
implementing the original ADA defined "physical or mental
impairment" to include, in relevant part, "[a]ny physiological disorder,
or condition ... affecting [the] neurological [system]" or "[a]ny mental
or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities."238 These regulations also defined "major life activities" to
include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 239
Title I of the ADA, relating to employment, prohibited covered
entities from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability240 in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."24'
Several different portions of the original ADA's implementing
regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC),24 2 a lengthy set of interpretive guidelines,243 and
hundreds of judicial opinions2" were dedicated to distinguishing the
conditions that would and would not result in an individual's protection
under the statute.
For example, Title I of the original ADA clarified that the term
"qualified individual with a disability" did "not include any employee
or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when
237. ADA § 3(2)(A)-(C).
238. 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2007) (establishing, prior to the ADAAA
Regulations, the definition of physical or mental impairment).
239. Id. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i).
240. Title I of the ADA defined a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." ADA
§ 101(8) (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Id. § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012).
242. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (clarifying that a protected mental impairment
includes "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities").
243. See, e.g., Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
29 C.ER. app. pt. 1630 (2013) ("It is important to distinguish between conditions that are
impairments and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural, and economic
characteristics that are not impairments.... The definition, likewise, does not include
characteristic predisposition to illness or disease.... The definition ... does not include
common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper where these are not
symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder. Environmental, cultural, or economic
disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education, or a prison record are not impairments.").
244. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (West 2013) (listing in the Notes of Decisions 44-
149 hundreds of cases that distinguish protected disabilities from unprotected conditions).
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the covered entity acts on the basis of such use."245 Title I of the
original ADA, however, also clarified that an individual who qualified
according to the following criteria should not be excluded from
protection:
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation
program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or
has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer
engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not
engaging in such use .. . .246
Importantly, Title I of the ADA also specifically excluded
"compulsive gambling" (as well as kleptomania and pyromania) from
the definition of disability.247 The exclusion is complete; that is,
individuals who have successfully completed a gambling rehabilitation
program and are no longer engaged in gambling are not excepted from
the exclusion (i.e., are not protected) in the same way that individuals
who have successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program and
are no longer engaged in the use of drugs are excepted from the
exclusion.248 Case law interpreting the original ADA confirms that
individuals with gambling disorder are not protected.2 49
The reason for the ADA's exclusion of compulsive gambling from
the definition of disability is unclear, although the exclusion may have
its origins in Rezza v US. Department of Justice250 In Rezza, a
special agent of the FBI named Anthony Rezza was employed as an
FBI agent beginning in 1964.251 On July 11, 1985, Rezza bet (and lost)
$2,000 in government funds at a casino located in Atlantic City.252 On
July 12, 1985, Rezza entered a twenty-two-day treatment program and
245. ADA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12114.
246. Id. § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12114.
247. Id. § 511(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12210.
248. Id § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12114.
249. See, e.g, Labit v. Akzo-Nobel Salt, Inc., No. 99-30047, at *2 & n. 13 (5th Cir.
Feb. 7, 2000) ("Congress specifically excluded compulsive gambling as a disability under the
[ADA]."); Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 878, 882 (D. Ariz. 2010)
("Congress expressly excluded compulsive gambling, along with various sexual disorders,
kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current
drug use, from the ADA's definition of disability.... Plaintiff's theory . .. is that compulsive
gambling is synonymous with depression.... [T]he Court rejects this approach given the
ADA's express exclusion of compulsive gambling as a disability.").
250. SeeNo. 87-6732, 1988 WL 48541, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1988).
251. Id.at*1.
252. Id
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then returned to active duty on September 3, 1985.253 Thereafter,
Rezza performed his job duties satisfactorily while attending twice-
weekly Gamblers Anonymous meetings and remaining abstinent from
gambling.254 The FBI terminated Rezza's employment on August 15,
1986.255
Following his termination, Rezza sued the FBI, the Department
of Justice, and other defendants, arguing that he was a compulsive
gambler and that his termination resulted from an incident caused by
his compulsive gambling in violation of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.256 Rezza then filed a motion for summary
judgment, contending that under section 504, compulsive gambling is
a protected handicap.257 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania relied on the APA's inclusion of
pathological gambling in the then-current DSM-III-R (1987) to state
that Rezza's "'compulsive gambling'. . . may come within the abstract
definition of 'psychological impairment' necessary for a mental
impairment.2 " However, the court ultimately denied Rezza's motion
for summary judgment due to the existence of a material fact issue as
to whether Rezza was "otherwise qualified" to be an FBI agent.259
Rezza's complaint, filed in 1986 and adjudicated and ultimately
settled in 1988 2 -prior to the 1990 enactment of the ADA-may be
the source of the ADA's exclusion of "compulsive gambling" from the
ADA's definition of "disability." Indeed, at least one ADA historian
has stated that the conditions that are excluded from the definition of
disability, including the impulse control disorder exclusions, were
"reportedly derived from court cases regarding similar legislation."2 '
The ADA's complete exclusion of compulsive gambling from the
definition of disability also may be due to its original classification as
an impulse control disorder. As discussed in Part II of this Article, the
APA initially classified pathological gambling as an impulse control
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Rezza v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 698 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
257. Id.
258. Rezza 1988 WL 48541, at *3.
259. Id. at *3, *6.
260. Id.
261. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
AMERICANS wITH DISABILmES AcT 41 (2005).
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disorder (alongside kleptomania, 262 pyromania, 263  and intermittent
explosive disorder") in the DSM-Hl. As late as 2000-ten years after
the enactment of the original ADA-the APA continued to classify
pathological gambling in the DSM-IV-TR as an impulse control
disorder (still alongside kleptomania, pyromania, intermittent
explosive disorder, and trichotillomania 26). 26 6 Not until May 2013, in
the DSM-5, did the APA rename the condition gambling disorder and
reclassify it under "Non-Substance-Related Disorders" within
"Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders."2 67 Gambling disorder
certainly may have suffered in its treatment by Congress due to the
disorder's linkage to the other impulse control disorders. That is,
stealing, fire setting, and hair pulling may not have "sounded" in
disability as much as other traditional neurological and psychiatric
conditions.
With respect to other health conditions that were not specifically
excluded from protection, the question of whether individuals with
such conditions would be protected by the ADA required a case-by-
case analysis of whether the condition constituted a physical or mental
impairment and, if so, whether the impairment substantially limited a
major life activity.2 " The case law interpreting the original ADA made
clear that individuals with episodic symptoms, as well as individuals
who took medications that controlled their symptoms, were not
protected individuals with disabilities. In Johnson v North Carolina
Department of Health & Human Services, for example, the United
262. Kleptomania, according to the DSM-III, is the "recurrent failure to resist
impulses to steal objects that are not for immediate use or their monetary value." DSM-III,
supm note 3, at 293.
263. Pyromania, according to the DSM-II, is the "recurrent failure to resist impulses
to set fires and intense fascination with setting fires and seeing them burn." Id. at 294.
264. Intermittent explosive disorder, according to the DSM-II, is characterized by
"several discrete episodes of loss of control of aggressive impulses that result in serious
assault or destruction of property." Id. at 295.
265. Trichotillomania, according to the DSM-IV-TR, "is the recurrent pulling out of
one's own hair" for pleasure, gratification, or relief of tension "that results in noticeable hair
loss." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at 674.
266. Secid.
267. DSM-5, supm note 2, at 585.
268. See, e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 E3d 1053, 1058-61 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether an individual's mental health
conditions substantially limited the individual's ability to interact with others); McGeshick v.
Principi, 357 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004) ("To be substantially limited in a major life
activity, 'an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives.'
The impairment's impact must 'be permanent or long term."' (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185 (2002))).
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States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held
that a social worker did not meet the definition of an individual with a
disability under the ADA because her bipolar disorder and migraines
did not substantially limit a major life activity.6 1 Similarly, in Doebele
v Spnt/United Management Co., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that none of an employee's mental health
conditions substantially limited the employee's major life activity of
communicating with others.270 More broadly, in Olson v Geneml
Electric Astrospace, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit clarified that neither multiple personality disorder nor a sleep
disorder constituted a disability without proof that the disorder also
substantially limited a major life activity."
By 2008, Congress had grown weary of the limitations placed by
courts on the classes of individuals eligible to receive protections
under the ADA.272 On September 25, 2008, President George W Bush
signed the ADAAA into law.273 The ADAAA continued to use a three-
prong definition of disability including, "with respect to an
individual[,] ... a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; ... a record
of such an impairment; or ... being regarded as having such an
impairment."274  The ADAAA further stated, "The definition of
disability ... shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals ... to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the
ADAAA]."275
The ADAAA also expanded the list of activities that constituted
major life activities by adding "concentrating" and "thinking"276 as well
as the "operation of a major bodily function," which was defined in
relevant part to include "neurological [and] brain ... functions."277 In
addition, the ADAAA expressly stated that "[a]n impairment that is
episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a
major life activity when active" and that "[t]he determination of
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be
269. 454 F. Supp. 2d 467 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
270. 342 E3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003).
271. 101 F.3d 947, 952-53 (3d Cir. 1996).
272. ADAAA § 2(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
273. Id. § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
274. Id. § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
275. Id.
276. The regulations implementing the original ADA only included "caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working" within the list of "major life activities." See29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007).
277. ADAAA § 3,42 U.S.C. § 12102.
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made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures
such as ... medication ... or .. . learned behavioral or adaptive
neurological modifications.""8 The ADAAA became effective January
1, 2009.279
On March 25, 2011, the EEOC published final regulations
implementing the ADAAA in the employment context. In relevant
part, these regulations define a "physical or mental impairment" as
"[a]ny physiological disorder or condition ... affecting [the]
neurological [system]" as well as "[a]ny mental or psychological
disorder, such as an intellectual disability (formerly termed 'mental
retardation'), organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities."28' In relevant part, these regulations also
define a "major life activity" that must be substantially limited by the
physical or mental impairment to include "concentrating, thinking,
communicating, interacting with others, and working," as well as
"[t]he operation of a major bodily function," including "neurological
[and] brain ... functions."28 These regulations clarify that the "term
'substantially limits' shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive
coverage" and "is not meant to be a demanding standard."283 These
regulations further state that the "primary object of attention in cases
brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have
complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has
occurred, not whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a
major life activity."2" According to the EEOC, "the threshold issue of
whether an impairment 'substantially limits' a major life activity
should not demand extensive analysis.""' Finally, these regulations
state, "The determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment8
Even after the enactment of the ADAAA, however, Congress
continued to exclude certain conditions from the definition of
disability. Today, the ADA as amended continues to exclude
"compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania" from the
2 7 8. Id.
279. Id. § 8, 29 U.S.C. §705 (2012).
280. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978 (Mar. 25, 2011).
281. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2012).
282. Id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i)-(ii).
283. Id § 1630.2(j).
284. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii).
285. Id.
286. Id. § 1630.20)(1)(iv).
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definition of disability.287  Many state laws also continue to exclude
individuals with gambling disorder from protected status. For
example, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act,288 which
was designed "to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all
persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination
or abridgment on account of. . . physical [or] mental disability [among
other indicators]," 289 continues to exclude "compulsive gambling" from
the definition of both "mental disability"" and "physical disability.""
As discussed in more detail in the final Part, immediately below, I
argue that individuals with gambling disorder should be subject to an
individualized assessment of whether they have a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity and, if so,
whether they are qualified individuals, instead of being expressly
excluded from protection under the ADA as amended and analogous
state antidiscrimination laws.293 If a particular individual has an
impairment that meets the definition of a disability and falls within the
definition of a qualified individual, then I argue that the law should be
applied to prohibit discrimination based on such disability.294
VII. ARGUMENTS AND PROPOSALS
This Article argues that the exclusion of individuals with
gambling disorder from state mental health parity laws and state
benchmark health plans (as described in Part IV) and from federal and
state antidiscrimination laws (as described in Part VI) is wrong for
seven reasons.
287. See42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2) (2012).
288. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12900 (2012).
289. Id. § 12920.
290. Id. § 12926(j) ('Mental disability' does not include sexual behavior disorders,
compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs.").
291. Id. § 12926(m)(6) ('Physical disability' does not include sexual behavior
disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use
disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs.").
292. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2014) ("The determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.
However, in making this assessment, the term 'substantially limits' shall be interpreted and
applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for
'substantially limits' applied prior to the ADAAA."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining
a "qualified individual" under the ADAAA).
293. See sources cited supra notes 287-291.
294. See, e.g., ADA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (setting forth the ADA's antidis-
crimination provisions in the context of employment).
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First, the exclusion of individuals with gambling disorder from
legal protections is not supported by the current scientific literature.
As discussed in detail in Part III, scientists now understand gambling
disorder in terms of its similarities to the substance-related and
addictive disorders, not the impulse control disorders. Indeed, the APA
has specifically stated that gambling disorder's new name and
classification reflects clinical research findings suggesting "that
gambling disorder is similar [to alcohol use disorder and other]
substance-related disorders in clinical expression, brain origin,
comorbidity, physiology, and treatment."295 Dr. Charles O'Brien, who
chaired the DSM-5's Substance-Related Disorders Workgroup, has
also stated that research suggests that "gambling behaviors activate
[neural] reward systems similar to those activated by drugs of abuse
and produce some behavioral symptoms that appear comparable to
those produced by the substance use disorders."296 Data is emerging
that gambling and substance use disorders have common underlying
genetic vulnerabilities and that both are associated with similar
biological markers and cognitive deficits.297 Promising treatments for
gambling also have been based on those for substance-related and
addictive disorders.2 " Finally, the APA has firmly stated, "[L]ittle
evidence exists on the associations between [the impulse control
disorders of trichotillomania, intermittent explosive disorder,
kleptomania, and pyromania] and gambling disorder."299 In summary,
the scientific literature does not support health and disability law's
exclusion of individuals with gambling disorder from protections that
are available to individuals with other substance-related and addictive
disorders.
Yet, the exclusions remain. As discussed in Part IV Nevada's
current benchmark health plan provides health insurance benefits for
individuals with substance-related and addictive disorders, but not
gambling disorder. By further example, Nevada's and New Mexico's
mental health parity and essential health benefits laws exclude
individuals with gambling disorder from mandated health insurance
benefits and mental health parity protections." As discussed in Part
VI, the ADA as amended and analogous state antidiscrimination laws
295. See Substance-Related andAdddve Disorders, supra note 8, at 1.
296. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 481.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Petry et al., supm note 36, at 495.
300. NEv. REv STAT. § 689A.0455 (2014); N.M. STAT. § 59A-23E-18 (2013).
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continue to exclude individuals with gambling disorder as well as
individuals with other impulse control disorders from disability
discrimination protections, even though these laws protect individuals
with non-impulse-control disorders. These exclusions are simply
unsupported by the current scientific literature.
Second, and related to the first, many of the distinctions in health
insurance and antidiscrimination laws between protected and
nonprotected conditions exist due to early findings regarding the
neurobiological basis of the protected conditions. For example,
Nevada's mental health parity law requires health insurance benefits to
be provided for only six traditional mental health conditions
(schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major
depressive disorder, panic disorder, and obsessive-compulsive
disorder) because the Nevada State Assembly believed these
conditions, but not others, were "biologically based.""'O In the fifteen
years since the Nevada State Assembly enacted this law, functional
neuroimaging studies have shown that gambling disorder has a
biological basis. For example, neuroimaging studies of groups of
individuals with gambling disorder show "decreased activation[] of the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex of the brain, which is located in the
frontal lobe and is implicated as a critical component in the processing
of risk and decision making.""o2 Neuroimaging data also shows
"diminished ventral striatal activation observed in individuals with
gambling and drug addictions[,] suggest[ing] that the mesocortico-
limbic dopamine system is involved in both substance and behavioral
addictions."o" Other neuroimaging studies have "measured higher
levels of activity in parts of the brain's limbic system and prefrontal
cortex when monetary rewards were present versus computer points,
suggesting increased sensory and limbic activation with increased risks
and rewards."' Still "[o]ther [brain] imaging studies have implicated
brain regions that are involved in attention processing when comparing
non-problem gamblers" with individuals with gambling disorder.30
"Collectively, these [neuroimaging] findings suggest [that] a complex
301. NEv. REv. STAT. § 689A.0455(1)-(2) (originally enacted in 1999, now (and still
only) requiring certain health insurance policies to provide coverage for the treatment of just
six conditions that the Nevada Assembly believes are "biologically based").
302. See, e.g., 6 Gamblng and the Bnun: Why Neuroscience Research Is Vital to
Gamblig Reseaar NAT'L CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE GAMING 4-5 (2011), http://www.ncrg.org/
sites/default/files/uploads/docs/monographs/ncrgmonograph6final.pdf (emphasis omitted).
303. Id. at 5.
304. Id (emphasis omitted).
3 0 5. Id.
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network of brain regions is activated during gambling and related
behaviors.""o' Therefore, laws such as the Nevada mental health parity
law that state or suggest that gambling disorder is not "biologically
based" are not supported in the current scientific literature.
In addition to these scientific reasons, there are other clinical,
ethical, and economic arguments against health and disability laws'
exclusion of individuals with gambling disorder from legal protections.
In the clinical context, gambling disorder is viewed as a serious mental
health condition that can have devastating health, social, occupational,
and legal consequences for the disordered gambler.30 ' Gambling
disorder is estimated to affect approximately 1% of the general adult
population in the United States,30 and "[a]pproximately 2.6 million
[disordered] gamblers are estimated to need treatment each year."09
"Up to half of individuals in treatment for gambling disorder have
suicidal ideation, and about 17% have attempted suicide.""o In the
past, a lack of health insurance coverage of gambling disorder
treatments may have reflected the lack of scientific research regarding
the efficacy of available treatments. Insurers understandably did not
want to pay for treatments that were not proven safe and efficacious.
Now, clinicians view gambling disorder as a highly treatable disease,'
and current research studies suggest a number of promising therapies,
including behavioral therapies and drug therapies."'
Given these advances in the understanding of gambling disorder,
my third argument is that it does not make clinical sense for health
insurance policies and plans to exclude individuals with gambling
3 0 6. Id.
307. See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 589 (listing serious functional consequences of
gambling disorder, including impacted areas of psychosocial, health, and mental health; the
loss of important relationships; and the adverse impact on employment and educational
activities).
308. Gamblin and Health i the Workplace: A Reseamrh-Based Guide About
Gambling Disorders for Human Resources and Employee Assistance Prokssionals, supra
note 30, at 1. "An additional 2.3 percent have had some problems with gambling in their
lifetime but have not met diagnostic criteria for pathological gambling. [These individuals
are referred to as] 'subclinical' or 'problem gamblers."' Id. at 5.
309. Jeffrey Marotta et al., 2010 National Survey of Publoly Funded Problem
Gamblig Services, Ass'N PROBLEM GAMBLING SERVICES ADMINS. 15 (2011), http://www.
apgsa.org/national_overviewdocs/2010%20APGSA%20Survey/20Report.pdf
310. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 587.
311. See, e.g., Leena M. Sumitra & Shannon C. Miller, Pathologic Gambling
Disorder: How To Help Patients Curb Risky Behavior When the Futum Is at Stake,
POSTGRADUATE MED. (July 2005), http://www.jurispro.com/uploadArticles/Miller-Patho
logical.pdf ("[Cilinical experience suggests that pathologic gambling disorder is highly
treatable.").
312. See discussion supra Part III.
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disorder from insurance coverage. Individuals like Gary who live in
states like Nevada and do not have private health insurance coverage of
gambling disorder may not obtain early treatment, resulting in the
worsening of symptoms and possible death by suicide. By
comparison, when an individual is diagnosed with stage I cancer,
private health insurance will immediately cover cancer treatments that
are proven to be safe and efficacious in order to prevent the metastasis
of that cancer and the ultimate death of that individual.
Similarly, when an individual has major depression, private health
insurance will cover depression treatments that are proven to be
efficacious in order to prevent the individual from having suicidal
ideations and from eventually committing suicide. Likewise, when an
individual has gambling disorder, private health insurance should cover
gambling treatments that are proven to be safe and efficacious in order
to prevent the individual's gambling disorder from worsening,
including preventing the individual from committing an illegal act that
could exclude the individual from disability income insurance benefits
and antidiscrimination protections. Again, as current studies show,
"Up to half of individuals in treatment for gambling disorder have
suicidal ideation, and about 17% have attempted suicide.""'
Additional studies show, "The majority of crimes committed by
problem gamblers are fueled by their gambling (either to obtain money
to gamble with or to pay gambling debts)."3 14 If death and a life of
crime are not clinically and socially acceptable options for individuals
with cancer or major depression, they should not be acceptable options
for individuals with gambling disorder.
My fourth argument against health and antidiscrimination law's
current treatment of individuals with gambling disorder is also a
clinical argument. As discussed in Part I11, individuals with gambling
disorder are likely to have other mental conditions as well, including
substance use disorders and depressive disorders.' In some
individuals, the other disorder may manifest before the gambling
disorder.' In other individuals, the manifestation of gambling
disorder occurs first.' As detailed in Part III, one study found that
313. DSM-5, supm note 2, at 587.
314. See, eg., Gamblig and Cime, GA. STATE UNIV. 1, http://www2.gsu.edu/-psyjge/
Fact/PG_%20Crime_04_10.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (emphasis omitted).
315. DSM-5, supra note 2, at 589.
3 16. Id.
317. Id
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96.3% of individuals with gambling disorder also suffered from some
other psychiatric or addictive disorder."'
Remember that Nevada's benchmark health plan does provide
health insurance benefits for inpatient and outpatient treatment of
alcohol use disorder and other substance related disorders,"' but that
the plan does not provide insurance benefits for inpatient or outpatient
treatment of gambling disorder or any other health condition that was
classified as an impulse control disorder as of March 31, 2012.320
Because treatment for a comorbid disorder may be qualitatively or
quantitatively different, or less successful, given the presence of
gambling disorder, the lack of private insurance benefits for gambling
disorder does not make clinical sense. If gambling disorder always
manifested itself after the presence of another disorder, such as alcohol
use disorder or another substance use disorder, an argument could be
made that greater health insurance benefits should be provided for the
first disorder under the theory that treatment of the first disorder could
lessen the occurrence or severity of gambling disorder. Research
suggests, however, that approximately 23.5% of individuals with
gambling disorder develop gambling disorder before any other
psychiatric problem and that 2.2% of individuals with gambling
disorder develop gambling disorder and other psychiatric problems at
about the same time.321 These two groups of individuals in particular
may benefit from private health insurance coverage of gambling
disorder because early treatment of the gambling disorder could lower
the occurrence or the severity of a comorbid disorder.
A fifth argument against health and disability law's treatment of
individuals with gambling disorder is grounded in principles of
biomedical ethics, including the principle of justice. That is, when
insurance companies and lawmakers choose to protect most
individuals with physical and mental health conditions but not
individuals with gambling disorder, there is a question as to whether
individuals with gambling disorder are being treated justly and fairly.
According to ethical guidelines used in clinical and research contexts,
"An injustice occurs when some benefit to which a person is entitled is
318. Kessler et al., supm note 74, at 1356-57.
319. See Nevada EHB Benchmark Plan, supra note 170, at 3, rows 26-27; Group I
POS C-XV-500-HCR: AttachmentA Benefit Schedule, NAT'L Ass'N INs. COMMISSIONERS
13, http://www.naic.org/cciio/NVpdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) (listing covered substance
abuse services).
320. See E-mail from Glenn Shippey to author, supm note 171 (noting the section 8.18
list of exclusions that includes "[i]mpulse control disorders").
321. See Kessler et al., supm note 74, at 1357.
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denied without good reason ... . A second way in which an
injustice occurs is when equals are not treated equally."' These
guidelines beg the following questions: should individuals with non-
gambling-related mental health conditions be treated better than
individuals with gambling disorder? And, does the fact that an
individual's disease relates to gambling disorder mean that the general
starting point of equality no longer applies?
To analyze questions such as these, there are several widely
accepted maxims of distributing benefits and protections in the health
care, disability, and biomedical and behavioral research contexts that
provide guidance, including: "(1) to each person an equal share, (2) to
each person according to individual need, (3) to each person according
to individual effort, (4) to each person according to societal
contribution, and (5) to each person according to merit."324 The first
two of these five methods of distributing benefits are particularly
illustrative in the context of gambling disorder. If each individual
should receive an equal share of legal protections and benefits, then
individuals with gambling disorder should have the same legal
protections as individuals with cancer, quadriplegia, bipolar disorder,
and Alzheimer's disease. If each individual should receive protections
according to individual need, the analysis becomes more difficult.
A needs-based method of allocating legal protections would
require difficult choices to be made between the legal needs of, for
example, (1) a stage-IV cancer patient versus (2) an individual with
complete quadriplegia versus (3) an individual with bipolar disorder
whose symptoms may be well-controlled by medication versus (4) an
individual with gambling disorder whose symptoms may be mild (i.e.,
only four DSM-5 diagnostic criteria may be present) versus (5) an
individual with gambling disorder whose symptoms may be severe
(i.e., a history of attempted suicide combined with eight or nine DSM-
5 diagnostic criteria). Given that the current scientific literature shows
that gambling disorder is a severe and potentially disabling condition
and that up to 17% of individuals in treatment for gambling disorder
322. The Belmont Report, authored by the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, sets forth basic ethical principles
and guidelines for the protection of human research subjects in biomedical and behavioral
research. See The Belmont Report U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Apr. 18, 1979),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html. For history and context
relating to the Belmont Report, see Stacey A. Tovino, A "Common" Proposal, 50 Hous. L.
REV. 787, 800-01 nn.50-51 (2013).
323. The BelmontRepor4 supra note 322, at 6.
3 2 4. Id.
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have attempted suicide,"' outright exclusions that apply to all
individuals with gambling disorder, regardless of the severity of
symptoms, but not all individuals with other physical and mental
health conditions, cannot be justified. A more just approach would
involve a case-by-case analysis of the severity of the health condition
of the individual with gambling disorder instead of an outright
exclusion.
My sixth argument is based in economics. Disordered gamblers
produce significant economic costs that are borne by society. "These
costs ... carry over to family members, friends, employers, creditors,
health systems, criminal justice systems, and the community as a
whole.""' One question is whether the costs associated with treating
and insuring individuals with gambling disorder may have long-term
societal returns. Studies conducted in the context of alcohol and drug
use disorders do show that treating alcohol and drug use disorders can
yield significant clinical and economic returns on an employer's group
health plan or a public health care program's initial treatment
investment.
For example, a group of researchers published in 2000 the results
of a study conducted in the state of Washington that examined the
clinical and economic returns on addiction treatment provided to 263
Medicaid-eligible drug addiction treatment clients."' The clinical and
economic returns were calculated based on an analysis of several
variables (each of which was assigned a cost), including:
number of days experiencing medical problems, overnight
hospitalizations for medical treatment, emergency room visits for
medical treatment, clinic or physician visits for medical treatment, days
experiencing psychological or emotional problems, days in inpatient
psychiatric treatment, days in hospital outpatient psychiatric treatment,
days in outpatient psychiatric treatment, income received from
employment, money spent on alcohol, money spent on drugs, and days
engaged in illegal activities."'
The study demonstrated that each dollar invested in full-continuum
(FC) addiction care (defined as care that begins with an inpatient
hospital or residential stay, is followed by intensive outpatient services,
and is followed by outpatient aftercare) and partial-continuum (PC)
325. SeeDSM-5, supm note 2, at 587.
326. See, eg., Marotta et al., supra note 309, at 1.
327. See Michael T. French et al., Benefit-CostAnalysis ofResidentidl and Outpadent
Addiction Treatment in the State of Washington, 24 EVALUATON REV. 609, 626 (2000).
328. Seeidat617-18.
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addiction care (defined as care that begins with intensive outpatient
care and is followed by additional less intensive outpatient care)
yielded returns of approximately 9.7 and 23.3 times their initial
investments, respectively.329 The study also demonstrated that the
average cost of treatment amounted to $2,530 for FC addiction care
and $1,137 for PC addiction care, and that the average economic
benefit amounted to $20,363 for FC addiction care and $12,310 for
PC addiction care, producing a net economic benefit of both FC and
PC addiction care.330 The study authors formally concluded that their
results strongly suggest that both FC and PC addiction care can
generate positive and significant net benefits to society.' My sixth
argument, then, is that before insurers and lawmakers point to cost
reasons to support their discrimination against individuals with
gambling disorder, additional research needs to be conducted. This
research may show that a short-term investment in the inpatient and
outpatient treatment and health insurance coverage of individuals with
gambling disorder produces long-term societal returns.
My seventh and final argument relates to eliminating the stigma
associated with gambling disorder. Gambling disorder was previously
thought to be a social, not a medical problem.332 Even today, some
individuals view gambling disorder as a sign of moral failing,
weakness, or lack of willpower, rather than a medical disease with a
neurobiological basis.3" Efforts to treat and insure gambling disorder
have been hampered by the general stigma against mental illness and
the particular stigma against gambling.334
Elsewhere, I traced and closely examined the roots of the stigma
associated with mental illness.3 . "Historically, individuals with mental
[illness] were [regarded] with contempt, fear, and cruelty, perhaps due
to the belief that mental [illness] stemmed from parental misdeeds,
demonic possession, or deficient character.""' Notwithstanding the
329. See id at 625-26.
330. Seeid at 625.
331. See id at 609, 627 ("It therefore appears that the State of Washington is receiving
value for its treatment investments in both clinical and financial terms-at least to the extent
that these samples are representative of patients entering treatment.").
332. See Charles Dackis & Charles O'Brien, Neurobiology ofAddiedon: Treatment
and Public Policy Ramifications, 8 NATuRE NEUROSCIENCE 1431, 1431 (2005) (discussing
the stigma against addiction).
333. Seeid.
334. Id
335. See Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integmtive Approach.,
42 AKRON L. REv 469, 475 (2009).
3 3 6. Id.
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research studies discussed in Part 111, mental illness, including
gambling disorder, remains poorly understood today.' It is my hope
that the legal proposals set forth below will continue to help dismantle
the stigma against gambling disorder and other addictive conditions.
In light of the seven arguments listed above, I make the following
five proposals that are designed to eliminate discrimination against
individuals with gambling disorder under health and disability law.
As discussed in Part IV, the ACA does require certain health
plans to provide some "[m]ental health and substance use disorder
services, including behavioral health treatment.""' The ACA is
unclear, however, about whether particular benefits, such as gambling
disorder benefits, fall within this provision. As a result, HHS allowed
each state to select a benchmark plan that would serve as a reference
plan in terms of benefits that are required to be included (and
permitted to be excluded)."' Health plans in each state that are
required to comply with the ACA's EHB provision must provide the
benefits that are included in the state's benchmark plan.340
Unfortunately, the content of each state's benchmark plan was
determined as of March 31, 2012, which ties offered benefits to the
DSM-IV-TR, thus excluding gambling disorder benefits from any
benchmark plan that excludes coverage for the impulse control
disorders.341
Thus, my first proposal is to amend the federal regulations
implementing the ACA's EHB provision to clarify that the content of
each state's benchmark plans must be tied to the DSM-5, which
classifies gambling disorder as a "Substance-Related and Addictive
Disorder." The result will be that any state benchmark plan that
excludes coverage for the impulse control disorders will not exclude
coverage for gambling disorder. Specifically, I propose to amend 45
C.ER. § 156.100 to add a new paragraph (c), and to revise paragraph
(b) and renumber paragraph (d), as follows:
45 C.F.R. § 156.100. EHB-Benchmark Plan Standards.
(b) EIB-benchmark selection standards. In order to become an
EHB-benchmark plan as defined in § 156.20 of this
subchapter, a state-selected base-benchmark plan must meet
337. Id.
338. SeeACA § 1302(b)(1)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012).
339. Essential Health Benefits Bullethn, supra note 158.
340. Id.
341. See E-mail from Glenn Shippey to author, supm note 171.
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the requirements for coverage of benefits and limits described
in § 156.110 of this subpart; and
[(c)] ERB-benchmark content The content of each state's selected
benchmark plan shall be determined with reference to the
DSM-5; and
(e) [(d)] Default base-benchmark plan. If a State does not make a
selection using the process defined in § 156.100 of this
section, the default base-benchmark plan will be the largest
plan by enrollment in the largest product by enrollment in the
State's small group market. If Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, or the Northern Marianna Islands do not
make a benchmark selection, the default base-benchmark
plan will be the largest FEHBP plan by enrollment.
Second, I propose to revise all state mental health parity laws that
expressly exclude individuals with gambling disorder from state-
mandated insurance benefits. As an illustrative example, I propose
that New Mexico's mental health parity law be amended to delete the
term "gambling addiction," as follows:
N.M. STAT. § 59A-23E-18.
A. A group health plan for a plan year of an employer beginning
or renewed on or after October 1, 2000, or group health
insurance offered in connection with that plan, shall provide
both medical and surgical benefits and mental health
benefits. The plan shall not impose treatment limitations or
financial requirements on the provision of mental health
benefits if identical limitations or requirements are not
imposed on coverage of benefits for other conditions.
F As used in this section, "mental health benefits" means
mental health benefits as described in the group health plan,
or group health insurance offered in connection with the plan;
but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of
substance abuse- [or] chemical dependency.
addietion.
I propose deleting New Mexico's exclusionary language for gambling
addiction (but not substance abuse or chemical dependence) only
because this Article focuses on gambling disorder. Because the ACA's
EHB provision now requires many health plans to offer "substance use
disorder benefits," New Mexico's remaining exclusionary language
relating to "substance abuse" and "chemical dependency" is, in large
part, preempted by the ACA and does not have current effect.
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Third, I propose to revise any state-mandated health benefit law
that does not expressly include gambling disorder and other mental
health conditions that have a biological basis. As an illustration, I
propose to revise Nevada's mental health parity law as follows:
NEv REV STAT. § 689A.0455. Coverage for treatment of conditions
relating to severe mental illness.
1. A policy of health insurance delivered or issued for delivery
in this state pursuant to this chapter must provide coverage for
the treatment of conditions relating to severe mental illness.
2. As used in this section, "severe mental illness" means any of
the following crntal illnesses that arm [mental illness that is]
biologically based and for which diagnostic criteria are
prescribed in the most recent edition of the Diagnosdc and
Stadstical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the
American Psychiatric Association[.]
(b) Sehizeaffctive disorder.
(e) Bipolar disorder
(d) ?4qjer depressive diserdera.
(f) 9bsessive cornpulsivc disefden
These health insurance proposals may encourage individuals with
gambling disorder to obtain early (or earlier) treatment, perhaps
lessening the chance that they engage in illegal acts that may exclude
them from other legal benefits and protections.
Fourth, I propose amending the ADA and analogous state laws to
delete the exclusion from the definition of disability for "compulsive
gambling." That is, I propose the amendment of 42 U.S.C.
§ 12211 (b)(2) to delete the term "compulsive gambling," as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 12211. Definitions
(b) Certain conditions
Under this chapter, the term "disability" shall not include ...
(2) eempusive-gambling, kleptomania- or pyromania; or
Analogous state antidiscrimination laws, such as the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act,342 also should be amended to delete
gambling disorder from exclusionary language, as follows:
342. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926 (2012).
2014] 249
TULANE LAW REVIEW
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926. Definitions
(j)(5)
"Mental disability" does not include sexual behavior
disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or
psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from the
current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs.
(m)(6) "Physical disability" does not include sexual behavior
disorders, eempulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or
psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from the
current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs.
Gambling disorder, now understood as a substance-related and
addictive disorder, should not continue to be treated like an impulse
control disorder under federal and state antidiscrimination law.
Fifth, instead of being expressly excluded from disability
antidiscrimination legislation, individuals with gambling disorder
should be subject to an individualized assessmente' of whether their
gambling disorder constitutes a disability, that is, whether they have
(1) a physical or mental impairment (2) that substantially limits (3) a
major life activity.3" If the gambling disorder is determined to fall
within the definition of a disability, then the individuals should be
assessed as to whether they are "qualified individuals," that is, whether
they, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that [they] hold[] or
desire[]."345 These individualized assessments may be modeled after
the case-by-case approaches followed by the SSA in the context of
SSDI benefits and by private disability income insurers who review
claims for benefits by individuals with gambling disorder, as discussed
in Part V
Because gambling disorder is listed as a mental disorder in the
DSM-5, gambling disorder should be regarded as a "mental
impairment"3 ' in satisfaction of the first element of the definition of
disability under the ADA. As discussed in Parts II and I of this
Article, gambling disorder could impact the major life activities of
343. 29 CER. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (2014).
344. In addition, the individual should also be assessed as to whether the individual
has a record of an impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment. See ADAAA
§ 4,42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-12103 (2012).
345. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) ("'[Q]ualified individual' means an individual who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.").
346. See 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(h)(l)-(2).
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concentrating, thinking, and working, as well as neurological and brain
functions for purposes of the third element of the definition of
disability.347 In terms of the second element ("substantially limits"), a
court that assesses claims by individuals with gambling disorders that
their gambling disorders substantially limit one or more of these major
life activities shall view the claims "broadly in favor of expansive
coverage," as required by the ADAAA.348 A court that assesses such
claims should not require "extensive analysis."" Next, a reviewing
court should determine whether the individual is a "qualified
individual," that is, whether the individual, "with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the [job the]
individual ... desires.""o If so, the reviewing court should undertake
one final assessment, that is, whether a covered entity has
discriminated against the qualified individual on the basis of
disability.35'
Many courts distinguish between "conduct" and "disability"; that
is, they permit an employer to discriminate against an individual who
has committed a crime (described as "conduct") but not an individual
because of his or her physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity (a "disability").352 The distinction between
"conduct" and "disability" has its roots in cases involving individuals
with alcohol use disorder who have been terminated from employment
following an arrest for driving while intoxicated or other similar
crime."' I anticipate that this distinction would come up in some cases
involving individuals with gambling disorder. In cases involving
individuals with gambling disorder who have not misappropriated
funds or committed other crimes, the individual may easily be able to
prove termination on the basis of disability. In cases involving
individuals with gambling disorder who have committed crimes, the
individual may be denied protection if the individual is unable to prove
347. Seeid § 1630.2(i)(1)(i)-(ii).
348. Id. § 1630.2().
349. Id § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii).
350. See42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
351. See id § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
352. See, eg., Brian T. Rabineau, Note, Those with Disabilities Take Heed- Eighth
Chrcult Suggests that ADA May Not Protect Those Who Fail To Control a Controllable
Disability, 65 Mo. L. REv. 319, 331-32 n.118 (2000).
353. See, e.g., id. at 331 (providing an excellent discussion of cases that distinguish
"conduct" from "disability" under the original ADA).
2014] 251
TULANE LAWREVIEW
that the discrimination was based on disability. That is, the court may
side with the defendant employer, who will argue that the termination
was on the basis of the illegal act. The conduct/disability distinction in
disability income insurance law and antidiscrimination law is yet
another reason that individuals with mild gambling disorder should be
encouraged to seek treatment before they commit any gambling-
related crimes.
VIII CONCLUSION
For a long time, individuals with gambling disorder have not had
significant legal protections under health and disability law. Private
health insurance policies and plans have frequently excluded treatment
for gambling disorder from health insurance coverage. Individuals
with gambling disorder who have sought disability income insurance
benefits from public and private disability income insurers tended not
to be successful in their claims. In addition, federal and state
antidiscrimination laws continue to exclude individuals with gambling
disorder from disability discrimination protections.
This Article is the first law review article to challenge the legal
treatment of individuals with gambling disorder by showing how
health insurance and antidiscrimination laws can hurt problem
gamblers. Using neuroscience, economics, and principles of
biomedical ethics to argue that individuals with gambling disorder
should have the same legal protections as individuals with substance-
related and other addictive disorders, this Article has proposed
important amendments to federal and state health insurance laws and
antidiscrimination laws.
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